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Is It 1958 or 1968? Three Notes on
the Longevity of the Revived 
Bretton Woods System
ITI SNOW widely accepted that the broad outlines of the current interna-
tional monetary system are as we described them almost two years ago
and labeled “the Revived Bretton Woods system.” This system’s main
features are
—the emergence of a macroeconomically important group of economies
that manage their currencies vis-à-vis the dollar to support export-driven
growth
—the United States as center and reserve currency country, providing
ﬁnancial intermediation services for foreign, and particularly Asian, sav-
ing through its national balance sheet, and willing to accept large current
account imbalances
—a group of poorer economies implementing export-led development
policies and exporting large amounts of capital to richer economies, mostly
the United States
—unusually low and even falling short- and long-term real interest rates
as a result of this glut of mobile global savings, and
—a group of industrial and emerging economies with ﬂoating exchange
rates, whose currencies are under incessant pressure to appreciate.
Not agreed and under vigorous discussion is how long this system can
last. Will it be a meteoric ﬂash with a spectacular end soon to come? Or
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producing the empirical results of this paper.will it last for the reasonably foreseeable future? We package these questions
here in an analogous question: Is the Revived Bretton Woods system at
the point in its development where the original Bretton Woods was in 1958
or 1968 or 1971?
In a series of publications we have provided a fundamental underpin-
ning for why we believe the system will last—that the situation today is
more like 1958.
1 We argue that the gains to the players from continuing
their actions outweigh the costs that many have argued will arise in an
endgame asset price shift or in unexploited beneﬁts of portfolio diversiﬁ-
cation. Rather than characterize the situation with geopolitically charged
rhetoric like “balance of ﬁnancial terror,”
2 we think it more valid to think
in the familiar economic terms of “mutually beneﬁcial gains from trade,”
such as might exist between any borrower and lender or between any pur-
veyor of goods and its customer.
Here we further develop our argument in the form of three notes address-
ing particular issues that have cropped up in critiques of the Revived Bretton
Woods view. These notes both respond to the critiques and continue to
expand our ideas. The ﬁrst note explains how we think about what is driving
capital ﬂows to the United States and keeping interest rates low. We view
the fact of unusually low long-term real interest rates for this stage of the
business cycle as a direct challenge to those who, exaggerating the impor-
tance of rumors about central bank reserve management practices, claim
that the end is near.
The second note seeks to provide some information about the experi-
ence of those emerging economies with chronic current account surpluses
since the breakdown of the ﬁrst Bretton Woods system. A very large empir-
ical literature evaluates the experience of emerging economies that have
run chronic deﬁcits, and the costs and frequency of associated ﬁnancial
crises. But we are not aware of any similar evaluations of the durability and
stability of those foreign exchange regimes that have resulted in unusual
sequences of current account surpluses and accumulations of international
reserves. The widespread view that the surplus regimes at the core of the
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1. Eichengreen (2004), in contrast, seems to favor 1968, that is, to allow the system a
few years more to run, whereas Frankel (2005a) favors 1971. Roubini and Setser (2004)
call for something even more immediate and apocalyptic, yet they acknowledge that the
day of reckoning may be as long as two years off.
2. Summers (2004a, 2004b).Revived Bretton Woods system will come to a quick and costly end has
likely been inferred in part from the recent experience of debtor emerging
economies. Our interpretation of the experience of these surplus regimes
is that they have been and may well remain durable and immune from
ﬁnancial crises.
The third note addresses an issue that has been raised frequently in crit-
icisms of our comparing the current system to the Bretton Woods system,
namely, that the United States is running large current account deficits
now, but it was not then. Of course, many aspects of the current system are
different from what they were in the heyday of Bretton Woods: Konrad
Adenauer is no longer chancellor of Germany, Charles de Gaulle is dead,
the United States no longer guarantees gold convertibility, and there is
now a serious pretender to reserve currency status. Our ﬁrst reaction was
that this difference was as superﬁcial as these others and not at the heart
of the comparison we wanted to draw.
But the United States did have a major balance of payments deﬁcit during
the Bretton Woods era, which was the proximate driver of the deterioration
of the system. So we relate the U.S. balance of payments deﬁcits under
Bretton Woods to the U.S. current account deficits under the Revived
Bretton Woods to show that there is a close analogy. This is something more
than an exercise in the history of economic ideas, because it plays into our
view that collateral is the key to opening sizable gross cross-border trade
in assets in a system that is short on trust.
Real Interest Rates Say It Is 1958
Why is the real interest rate in the United States so low and falling
today, in the growth phase of the U.S. and global business cycles, even as
the U.S. current account deﬁcit reaches record levels? At the end of June
2002, about when the euro began its recent appreciation, realized ten-year
real annual interest rates on U.S. Treasury securities were 3.70 percent
on nominal notes and 3.07 percent on inﬂation-protected securities. The
corresponding numbers at the end of December 2003 were 2.35 percent
and 1.95 percent, respectively. One year later the respective numbers were
1.17 percent and 1.63 percent, and as we write in mid-May 2005, they are
1.02 percent and 1.65 percent. This fall in rates has come in a period when
the media swirls daily with stories about foreigners losing conﬁdence,
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collapse as everyone tries to be the ﬁrst out the door. If all this is true, the
bond and credit markets have not noticed.
Three broad realities underpin our view of this global phenomenon, all
of which we expect to continue into the foreseeable future:
Reality 1: About fifteen years ago, hundreds of millions of under-
employed workers joined the world’s market economies. They had no
capital to speak of, but they had a desire to work in industry and to get
rich. One might expect that such an increase in the global supply of labor
would drive real interest rates up, but these workers came with an enor-
mously high saving rate and lived under the yoke of a dead ﬁnancial sys-
tem, which had served them in the past as a capital destroyer, as it does to
this day. They lacked modern technology and management. Theirs was a
communist society that was and is problematic geopolitically, which might,
in turn, make their access to cross-border credit problematic. This created
a profound global disequilibrium for the industrial world, equal in magni-
tude to the global unemployment problem of the Great Depression although
much more concentrated geographically. The industrial world’s economic
system has to resolve this fundamental imbalance over the course of time
by absorbing these workers. To focus today on trade imbalances when in
fact there is an enormous labor market imbalance is to make the same
mistake that economists and policymakers made in the 1930s.
Reality 2: The emerging economies that have developed most success-
fully are those that export capital on net. Joshua Aizenman, Brian Pinto,
and Artur Radziwill demonstrate, in a sample of forty-seven developing
countries from 1981 to 2001, that the net exporters of domestic savings
among them had signiﬁcantly higher growth rates.
3 They conclude that “a
rise in the self-ﬁnancing ratio [the stock of tangible capital supported only
by past national saving, divided by the actual stock of capital] from 1 to
1.1 is associated with an increase in the growth rate from 2.8% to 4.4%.
Further, reducing the self-ﬁnancing ratio from 1 to 0.9 is associated with a
drop in the growth rate from 2.8% to 2.2%.”
4 These estimates control for
differences in institutional quality as well as in trade and ﬁnancial openness.
They clearly contradict the usual assumption that developing countries
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3. Aizenman, Pinto, and Radziwill (2004).
4. Aizenman, Pinto, and Radziwill (2004, p. 9).have been successful in using net foreign saving to augment capital for-
mation and economic growth. We argue below that their results are con-
sistent with the idea that net exports of saving from poor countries support
two-way trade in private financial assets that improves the quality and
productivity of domestic capital formation.
Reality 3: The United States has a large and growing current account
deﬁcit, funded at this moment by the foreign private and ofﬁcial sectors at
low and falling real interest rates. In recent years the ofﬁcial sector has
taken up a large share of this deﬁcit.
Let us focus on reality 3 for a moment. We like to think about the United
States’ external deﬁcit problem in a simple loanable funds ﬂow framework.
After netting U.S. public and private investment demand from U.S. saving,
the United States has a demand for saving from the rest of the world that is
downward sloping when plotted against the real interest rate, as in ﬁgure 1:
the lower the real interest rate that it faces, the less the United States wants
to save and the more it wants to invest. Given a real interest rate, then, we






Source: Authors’ model described in the text.
Figure 1. Market Equilibrium for Loanable Fundscan read off the U.S. current account deﬁcit. Meanwhile there is an upward-
sloping supply of saving coming from the foreign private sector (we intro-
duce foreign official flows below), perhaps from asset managers looking
only at Sharp ratios and benchmarks, or perhaps from foreign industrial
corporations interested in return on capital. The higher the real interest rate
available in the United States, the more of this private foreign saving ﬂows
in. The intersection of these two curves determines the global real interest
rate, the U.S. current account deficit, and the rest of the world’s current
account surplus.
A looser ﬁscal policy might shift the demand for foreign saving upward
as in ﬁgure 2. This would bring in more foreign saving or, equivalently,
increase the current account deﬁcit. And it would cause the real interest
rate to rise, as in the Reagan-era deﬁcits of the early 1980s. Some of this
may be going on today, but it is clearly not dominant. Since 2002, mar-






Source: Authors’ model described in the text.
Figure 2. Effect of Expansionary Fiscal Policyketable U.S. debt has increased by more than one-third while nominal and
real interest rates have declined (table 1). Moreover, relative to those of other
industrial countries, the U.S. budget deﬁcit is not unusually large (ﬁgure 3);
it is hard to see why this factor alone would increase the U.S. current account
deﬁcit relative to the deﬁcits or surpluses of other industrial countries, espe-
cially given the much more rapid GDP growth rate (real and nominal) in
the United States.
Instead consider ﬁgure 4, which adds a vertical ofﬁcial sector supply
curve, reﬂecting the fact that policymakers have objectives other than a
narrow risk-return calculus localized to this small portion of national saving.
Their development goals require the export of domestic saving, and they will
accept whatever interest rate the market determines. Adding, horizontally,
this new public sector supply of foreign saving to the private sector supply
shifts total supply rightward and brings down the interest rate that clears
this global market for savings.
So, if a falling U.S. real interest rate is observed alongside a rising U.S.
current account deﬁcit, it can only mean that ofﬁcial capital is being pushed
into the United States and private capital is being pushed out, but by a smaller
amount than the ofﬁcial capital coming in. On net, capital is not being pulled
in by U.S. demand shifts. This is the combination of facts that shows us
that the United States is passive and that the foreign ofﬁcial sector is the
active player in global imbalances.
This means that the typical denunciation of U.S. “proﬂigacy” is worse than
useless for understanding the situation: it is actually misleading. Usually, this
rhetoric includes a reference to the role of the U.S. ﬁscal deﬁcit in reducing
net U.S. saving, but a larger ﬁscal deﬁcit should increase the interest rate.
Whatever the size of this effect, it has clearly been more than overcome by
the effects of foreign ofﬁcial capital pushing in.
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Table 1. Marketable U.S. Government Debt, Interest Rates, and Fiscal Deﬁcits,
2002–05
Item 2002 2003 2004 2005
Marketable debt (billions of dollars)
a 3,020 3,317 3,721 4,085
Average interest rate paid (percent a year)
a 4.99 4.11 3.61 3.94
Fiscal deﬁcit (percent of GDP)
b 1.5 3.4 3.6 3.0
Source: Bloomberg data.
a. As of March 31.
b. In preceding ﬁscal year.154 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
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a. Budget deficit data are for fiscal 2004; all other data are for calendar 2004.
b. Countries that have adopted the euro.
Figure 3. Fiscal Deﬁcits, Growth, and Inﬂation, Selected Countries, 2004
aOne often hears that private saving ﬂows to the United States are falling
because of increased risks, stemming perhaps from the worsening U.S. inter-
national investment position. This would show up as a shift of the private
supply curve in ﬁgures 1, 2, and 4 upward and to the left, and it would put
further upward pressure on real interest rates. But this is exactly the oppo-
site of what we observe. Rather, the evidence is far more consistent with a
downward slide along a given private supply curve after the public sector
supply is added. To be sure, foreign private saving is ﬁnancing far less of
the U.S. current account deﬁcit than it did, say, ﬁve years ago. But the rea-
son is that private investors are being driven out by ofﬁcial sector ﬂows
willing to replace them at much lower interest rates.
One should beware of making too much of a rising or falling fraction
of ofﬁcial sector ﬁnance in any given quarter or year. A steadily growing
ﬂow from the foreign ofﬁcial sector to the United States year in and year
out is not necessary to maintain the system. Ofﬁcial ﬂows are necessary only
when the foreign central bank must intervene to keep its currency under-
valued. As in a target zone exchange rate regime, when the private sector
is conﬁdent that the regime is durable and will be sustained by future inter-
ventions as the need arises, private inﬂows are sufﬁcient to provide the
deﬁcit ﬁnancing.
So far, so good. But it means that today’s low real interest rate is a
momentary ﬂow effect that will evaporate should ofﬁcial sector lending to
the United States dry up permanently. If this were to happen, the picture
would snap back from ﬁgure 3 to ﬁgure 1, and interest rates would jump.
If this is what the market expects, we should today see low short-term real
interest rates and much higher long-term rates. But we do not see this. Long-
term real rates are low—hence the conundrum that we are studying now.
Implicit in the real yield curve is that the equilibrium of ﬁgure 3 should
last a long time.
It follows that even a hint that Asian governments might reduce their ﬂow
demand for dollar assets will generate an immediate jump in the ten-year
rate in the United States. Indeed, many observers doubt that foreign ofﬁcial
interests in funding the U.S. current account deﬁcit are sustainable.
Back to Reality 1
The stakes are high indeed. Why should Asian authorities remain willing
to increase their claims against the United States? To answer this, we have
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as an exhaustible resource. In that context it is optimal for the government to absorb labor
more rapidly at the beginning of the regime. It follows that dollar wages are initially set at
a low level but rise over time to the world wage when the last worker is absorbed. See
Salant (1976) for a more general discussion.
6. We thank Vincent Reinhart for this insight.
to focus on the strategy that Asia (notably China) has chosen to solve the
development and unemployment problems that are part of reality 1.
The problem for China is to mobilize its existing enormous domestic
saving to create a growing, internationally competitive capital stock that
can rapidly employ hundreds of millions of workers in productive activity.
A serious constraint is the lack of a domestic ﬁnancial system capable of
channeling this saving into productive capital, technology, and management
skills.
The solution, perhaps stumbled upon inadvertently, has been to engage
in export-led growth, thereby providing an immediate global quality check
on the goods produced. This avoids falling off the cliff of another Great
Leap Forward. To get export markets open, part of the policy has been to
offer a large incentive to potential industrial exporters, both domestic and
foreign-based, in the form of low dollar wages and the expectation that
wages will rise only slowly toward world levels. Slowly rising dollar
wages could be associated with a gradual nominal revaluation of the ren-
minbi or a slightly higher rate of inﬂation than in China’s trading partners.
For example, a 3 to 5 percent revaluation of the renmimbi later this year and
the adoption of a carefully controlled ﬂoat of the exchange rate would not
signal the end or even a material change in the development strategy we
have described.
5
The typical problem in emerging economies is how not to offer too high
an industrial wage relative to wages elsewhere in the economy: too-rapid
industrialization could drive industrial wages sharply above agricultural
wages, deterring investment in industry and triggering a ﬂood of migration
to the cities. By keeping wages low and relatively uniform, an initially
low but rising currency helps both to induce resource transfers to industry
and to restrain migration to a rate consistent with capital formation in the
industrial sector.
6
Foreign direct investors have been encouraged because they bring the
discipline of international financial intermediation. Additional benefits
include technology transfer and the proven political clout to keep export
156 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005markets open. The importance of direct investment in keeping U.S. export
markets open has been questioned on a variety of grounds. Eswar Prasad
and Shang-Jin Wei argue that most foreign direct investment into China
comes from outside the United States and is not likely a signiﬁcant factor
in keeping U.S. markets open to Chinese exports.
7 Leaving aside the inher-
ent difﬁculty in determining the nationality of direct investors, we would
point out that Asian direct investors in China also have an enviable record
in penetrating U.S. markets and in dealing with the threat of U.S. protec-
tion. It seems likely to us that the building political pressure in the United
States to do something about the bilateral trade deﬁcit with China would be
more effective if U.S. and other multinational corporations were not active
in direct investment in China.
We are more than willing, however, to base our forecast of the durability
of the system on the lasting inability of domestic credit markets in emerg-
ing economies to efﬁciently intermediate domestic saving. The difﬁculty
in reforming ﬁnancial markets in these economies, and the frequency and
costs associated with crises in economies that have not been successfully
developed, are in our view the primary lesson provided by the failures of
development in Latin America.
But why does the need for international ﬁnancial intermediation (two-
way trade in financial assets) create saving-investment imbalances and a
flood of net capital exports in the first place? After all, an export-based
development policy need not imply a net export of capital. All that is
needed is export growth, and this can just as well be balanced by import
growth as not.
In general, the successful emerging economies have not needed net
foreign saving; such inﬂows are generally small and unreliable relative to
domestic saving (reality 2). Nevertheless, other things equal, even a small
addition of net foreign saving should contribute to investment and growth
in poor countries. A positive argument in favor of net exports of saving
requires that some other important ingredient to growth not be available
in equal measure.
Our hypothesis is that net exports of domestic saving are necessary to
earn the collateral required for efficient international intermediation of
domestic saving. Asian emerging economies do not need net foreign saving,
but they do need efﬁcient ﬁnancial intermediation. We have emphasized
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7. Prasad and Wei (2005).foreign direct investment and other types of international ﬁnancial inter-
mediation because we are not optimistic about the rapid development of
domestic credit markets. That is, residents of these countries can avoid
these markets by placing some of their assets off shore. These will return if
international investors are protected from political risk—especially impor-
tant when private capital is ﬂowing to and from a geopolitically problematic
country in large amounts. The government can relax this credit constraint
by keeping its balance sheet very strong versus the rest of the world, that
is, by building net reserves.
The government’s net reserves then provide protection for private inter-
national ﬁnancial intermediation against various geopolitical risks. In effect,
the emerging economy’s government promises to stay on the sidelines by
becoming a net creditor to the rest of the world. Note that a government can-
not borrow this credibility; it has to earn it by placing goods and services in
the rest of the world on net. And placing more goods and services in the
rest of the world than one is taking in means a current account surplus.
Imagine that foreign direct investment ﬂows are matched by ofﬁcial sec-
tor reserve growth in the balance of payments accounts and that the current
account is balanced. Then the capital account is balanced in terms of both net
and gross ﬂows. But the country sending the foreign direct investment is tak-
ing an unbalanced risk position, effectively buying equity and borrowing in
ﬁxed-interest securities. Usually, in private markets, this requires some col-
lateral from the lesser credit. The way an emerging economy delivers collat-
eral is by running a current account surplus. The faster the gross positions in
the capital account grow, the faster must the current account imbalance grow
to support the unbalanced risk positions. We believe that this view of current
account surpluses as collateral provides a ﬁrst explanation of the connection
between net and gross capital ﬂows, currently a noteworthy lacuna in models
of international ﬁnance, which ignore gross trade in assets.
Other Asia and Japan
A reasonable objection to our argument is that it does not ﬁt the more
developed countries in Asia, especially Japan, that have been the most eager
buyers of U.S. assets. In fact, it is useful to consider China and Japan as
spanning the problems facing Asia. Both Japan and China have an employ-
ment problem, but in Japan it is the result of a very long cyclical downturn,
whereas in China it is a long-term development problem. Both governments
158 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005look to export growth as a solution to this problem, and both have a long
history of managing the exchange rate.
For quite different reasons, both countries have been able to sterilize
very large reserve accumulations. In deﬂationary Asian countries, notably
Japan, it is difﬁcult to understand why there might be some limit on the
ability or motivation of the authorities to create yen in stemming an attack
on the currency. With interest rates at zero, it is costless to create as much
yen cash as is demanded, whereas dollar reserves produce a positive yield.
Normally, a limit on foreign exchange acquisition is reached when the
resulting monetary expansion causes excessive overheating and inﬂation.
But such an expansion is still not in sight for Japan and would not, in any
case, be the appropriate monetary policy.
The lessons of attacks on weak currencies and ﬁxed exchange rate re-
gimes seem to be the ones being applied by the global private ﬁnancial sec-
tor here. The authorities in such regimes face a limit on reserves or credit or
the amount of pain they are willing to put the economy through, and so each
attack on the currency is simultaneously a ratcheting up of the probability
that the currency will indeed collapse. Some observers seem to be holding a
case study of a typical speculative attack against a mirror and thinking that
private capital inﬂows likewise ratchet up the pain in Japan. Yet quite the
opposite is true in deﬂationary Japan. Japan has ceased its massive interven-
tion since the ﬁrst quarter of 2004, and the yen has actually depreciated
somewhat against the dollar. Our expectation is that the authorities will re-
turn to the market if private ﬂows to the United States again decline and the
yen again appreciates, especially if it is tested in another attack.
In China ﬁnancial repression has allowed the authorities to place domestic
assets generated by sterilization without much increasing domestic interest
rates, and it has been very successful in containing inﬂation. The People’s
Bank of China currently places three-year domestic currency debt in the
banks at an annual interest rate of about 3 percent and is experiencing pos-
itive carry on its foreign exchange.
8 Other emerging economies in Asia
with relatively open capital markets have followed a middle course of try-
ing to stay competitive with China but allowing some appreciation of their
currencies against the dollar, although still with heavy currency management
and accumulation of reserves. The success and durability of these efforts
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8. This in contradiction to the continual alarmist statements from Goldstein and Lardy
(2004), among others.are a matter of intense debate, but we doubt there is much to be gained from
continuing the debate at the theoretical level. We turn to the empirical
debate in the next section.
How Do Episodes of Reserve Accumulation End?
In a series of papers,
9 we have argued the case for a meaningful distinc-
tion between countries that allow private international investment decisions
to determine important macroeconomic variables such as the real exchange
rate and the current account balance, and countries for which government
investment decisions determine these magnitudes. We have referred to these
as “capital account countries” and “trade account countries,” respectively.
Trade account countries repress private ﬁnancial ﬂows and overwhelm
with ofﬁcial ﬂows those that slip through the repression. Capital account
countries, in contrast, do not block cross-border flows or significantly
intervene in foreign exchange markets. It is often assumed that the con-
ventional analytical framework developed to understand the behavior of
capital account countries applies also to trade account countries, because
capital and foreign exchange controls are mostly ineffective. In our view
this is entirely an unresolved empirical issue.
The opinion that the U.S. current account deﬁcit is unsustainable ﬂows
from a conviction that private international investors will be unwilling to
continue to accumulate net claims on the United States. In this view, more-
over, either the official capital flows that have partly financed the U.S.
current account deﬁcit will be overwhelmed by private sector ﬂows, or
governments will come to their senses in time to avoid a crisis. The usual
dark warning is that the longer it takes the ofﬁcial sector to realize the
inevitable truth, the harsher will be the consequences. The phase diagrams
of the speculative attack models dance in our collective heads.
We fully agree with half of this prediction. Two years ago we predicted
that private investors would become more reluctant to ﬁnance the U.S. cur-
rent account deﬁcit as ofﬁcial sector capital ﬂowed in.
10 We also predicted
the very large appreciation of the euro and other currencies whose trade in
foreign exchange markets is dominated by private capital ﬂows. This was
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9. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c).
10. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003).not unusual in itself. But we also argued that governments of a group of
what we called “trade account countries” (countries where repression of
private ﬁnancial ﬂows determine the real exchange rate and the current
account balance) had good reasons to continue to invest in the United States
for an extended period and that this would keep U.S. interest rates low, con-
trary to then-prevailing opinion.
11 The length of this period is derived from
an optimal rate of absorption of those countries’ unemployed labor. In our
view of the real forces behind this system, this suggests a decade at least.
So it is important to understand why nonresidents are supplying net
saving to the United States at very low expected yields and why this may
or may not continue. To us, it is irrelevant to the overall picture whether the
net foreign investment is in Treasury securities, agency securities, private
ﬁxed-income securities, equity, or something else. It is irrelevant whether
private or ofﬁcial foreigners take larger or smaller shares of the foreign
investment in the United States in any given year. It is mostly irrelevant how
the spreads across different classes of ﬁnancial instruments in the United
States might be affected. This is not a discussion of investment strategy or
asset allocation; it is entirely directional.
Historical Evidence
One way to begin to evaluate the durability of the Revived Bretton
Woods system and the likely consequences of its demise is to study the
experience of economies that have had unusually long sequences of current
account surpluses and accumulations of ofﬁcial reserves. Doubts about the
durability of the system have generally centered on the ability and willing-
ness of surplus economies to maintain an undervalued currency for an
extended period. Does historical experience suggest that periods of reserve
accumulation are followed by speculative attacks that generate a real
appreciation (through either inﬂation or a nominal appreciation), losses on
dollar reserves, and painful recessions as resources are transferred from
traded goods industries?
The experience of emerging economies with chronic current account sur-
pluses since the breakdown of the original Bretton Woods system in 1971
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11. The logic was that an increasingly indebted United States, with an interest rate
effectively underwritten by the trade account countries, would attract less private funding
from other (capital account) countries. Smaller net capital ﬂows meant smaller net current
account ﬂows, which would be accomplished through appreciation against the dollar.has not attracted much attention, perhaps because until recently they have
been quantitatively unimportant. An alternative possibility is that observers
assume that such regimes cannot last for long and will end badly, because
of the evidence provided by emerging economies with chronic deﬁcits.
Assumptions are necessary because past empirical work on crises and cur-
rent account reversals has considered only episodes identiﬁed by large
depreciations or swings in current accounts from deﬁcit to surplus.
12
The theoretical symmetry between speculative attacks on undervalued
currencies and those on overvalued currencies is well known.13 In an attack
on a strong currency, anticipated capital gains generate private capital inﬂows
when speculators believe the regime can be overwhelmed. Intervention to
limit nominal appreciation takes either of two forms, both with unfavorable
side effects: an increase in the monetary base, which raises the domestic
price level, or sterilization, which increases reserve assets and the govern-
ment’s domestic currency liabilities. The regime can appear to be stable for
a time, but the government’s tolerance for inﬂation or reserve accumulation
is limited, and a speculative attack will bring the regime to an end.
Data Methods: Identifying Precedents
To identify historical precedents for today’s surplus economies, we ﬁrst
identify sequences of reserve accumulation that might provide a typical
pattern for emerging economies that accumulate net reserves for an extended
period. We then examine the behavior of other variables in the years dur-
ing and after the accumulation sequence.
For a sample of 115 developing and industrial economies, we examine
yearly data from 1970 to 2004. We ﬁrst identify sequences of consecutive
years in which the economy experienced current account surpluses on
average and the government increased its net foreign asset position. For
surplus economies the change in the government’s net foreign asset position
is usually dominated by changes in international reserve assets, but our
measure of net reserve accumulation also includes changes in government
debt and other ofﬁcial sector capital ﬂows. We are interested in the con-
solidated government contribution to ﬁnancing the change in national net
foreign assets or its mirror image the current account balance. To further
restrict attention to episodes in which the government was an important
162 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
12. Frankel and Rose (1996); Razin and Milesi-Ferretti (1998).
13. Grilli (1986).participant in international ﬁnancial markets, we exclude episodes during
which the government generated less than 25 percent of the change in
national net foreign assets.
The typical experience of surplus economies during the three years
before the end of a sequence of net reserve accumulations and the three
years that followed is summarized in ﬁgure 5. Deﬁnitions and data sources
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Figure 5. Real Exchange Rate and Current Account Balances during and after 
an Episode
aare reported in appendix A, and detailed data for all accumulation episodes
in appendix C.
During periods of reserve accumulation, several regularities stand out.
First, with very few exceptions, the current account begins in surplus, and the
surplus increases during the period of net reserve accumulation. The average
increase in the surplus was 0.73 percent of GDP in year t − 3, 0.47 percent in
t − 2, and 0.18 percent in t − 1, the ﬁnal year of net reserve accumulation.
In t − 0, the ﬁrst year following the sequence of reserve accumulation,
the current account surplus declines by an average of 2.06 percent of GDP.
This certainly suggests that some important shock has occurred. Moreover,
the shock typically persists, with little further change in the current account
balance in the two years that follow.
In the ﬁnal three years of net reserve accumulation, the currency typi-
cally appreciates in real terms each year; the average cumulative increase
(we deﬁne the real exchange rate such that an increase represents an appre-
ciation) is about 4 percent. The behavior of the exchange rate before the
ofﬁcial sector leaves the market is not surprising and is fully consistent with
the conjecture that the growing current account surplus, appreciation of the
currency, and reserve accumulation reﬂect a growing fundamental disequi-
librium in the real exchange rate and the current account. This sequence is
supposed to end with a jump (appreciation) in the real exchange rate and a
gradual decline in the current account balance. Instead, in the average case,
the government retreats from the market, the currency depreciates in real
terms in the following year by 1.2 percent,
14 and the depreciation continues
for two more years. The real exchange rate ends more than 3 percent below
its level ﬁve years earlier, and the government enjoys a substantial capital
gain on its reserve accumulation.
The behavior of the macroeconomic variables when the government
stops accumulating net reserves clearly does not ﬁt with the standard model
of a speculative attack on a strong currency. With the government out of
the market, there is a “sudden start” of private capital inﬂows, as the model
predicts. But these inﬂows are associated with a persistent real deprecia-
tion of the currency, not an appreciation. Economic growth is above trend
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14. At the end of the original Bretton Woods system, Germany experienced a three-
year episode of reserve accumulation and currency appreciation followed by depreciation
in 1974. In this case, however, the cumulative appreciation was larger than the depreciation
in the following and subsequent two years. The usual assumption that reserve accumula-
tion ends with large capital losses on reserves is probably inﬂuenced by this episode.during the reserve accumulation episode and generally moderates there-
after. In most cases growth remains positive and recovers in a year or two.
A variety of shocks to the world economy could account for these empir-
ical regularities. For example, a decline in foreign demand for the country’s
exports could explain the swing in the current account and the decline in
growth. The deterioration in the national net foreign asset position is con-
sistent with a decline in the real exchange rate. Indeed, such a decline may
create the expected yield differentials necessary for the sudden start in
capital inﬂows. The deterioration of the national net foreign asset position
would be consistent with a real depreciation.
Another possibility is that intended or unintended ﬁnancial liberalization
allows residents to diversify away from domestic assets toward interna-
tional assets. For example, if China suddenly opened its capital markets,
residents’ desire to diversify into foreign currency assets would suggest a
depreciation of the renmimbi rather than the appreciation currently expected.
In this context it would be fully rational for the authorities to build a stock
of dollars now in anticipation of private demand when ﬁnancial markets
are liberalized. Moreover, it makes no sense to allow the renmimbi to
appreciate now only to depreciate sharply later.
China, Japan, and Korea
Seven economies accounted for two-thirds of worldwide international
reserve holdings at the end of 2004 and for three-quarters of the $600 bil-
lion growth in international reserve assets in that year. Three economies—
Japan, China (excluding Hong Kong), and Korea—held 45 percent of the
global total and acquired 60 percent of the 2004 increase. The general
sequence of current account imbalances, reserve gains, growth, and real
exchange rate changes described above holds even more clearly for this
group of economies. Several are in the midst of a stretch of reserve accu-
mulation today and have experienced two or three similar episodes in the
past. All seven have in the past experienced unusually long episodes of
net reserve accumulation relative to our complete sample: the champion
to date is Singapore with its twenty-seven-year run from 1974 through 2000.
It seems particularly relevant, in evaluating how the current episode of
reserve accumulation might end, to look at the previous experiences of
these seven economies. In this section we review the recent experience
of the “big three.” For each we present charts comparing, for each reserve
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tion on the left-hand side, and economic growth and the real effective
exchange rate on the right-hand side. Appendix B provides similar ﬁgures
for the other four economies: Hong Kong, India, Singapore, and Russia.
Japan has experienced three extended episodes of net reserve accumu-
lation in the post–Bretton Woods era: a three-year sequence from 1986 to
1988, a ﬁve-year sequence from 1992 to 1996, and a six-year sequence
that began in 1999 and continued through 2004 (ﬁgure 6). What might the
ﬁrst two episodes suggest for the current episode in Japan? We look ﬁrst
at the current account. In each episode the current account surplus (in bil-
lions of dollars) is growing before the net reserve accumulation begins. The
surplus moderates during the accumulation, then declines in the year before
and the year in which the accumulation ends. In the ﬁrst episode reserve
accumulation accounted for about 28 percent of the current account surplus
during the period of reserve growth, and in the second about 26 percent.
In the present episode the current account surplus has continued to grow.
Reserve accumulation absorbed about half of the surplus through 2004.
Considering just these data, one might expect a moderation in the rate of
reserve accumulation going forward, but not an end to the sequence of net
reserve gains.
In the two previous episodes, the real effective exchange rate and the
growth rate behaved as described above for the typical experience. The
exchange rate rose before and during the reserve accumulation but then
fell sharply for two or three years. In the ﬁrst episode the real exchange rate
fell in the year following the end of the accumulation and in 1986, the year
the authorities withdrew from the foreign exchange market. As is typical
for the larger sample, in both episodes the GDP growth rate rose during
the accumulation sequence and then turned down, for three years in the ﬁrst
episode and two years in the second.
During the recent episode both the real exchange rate and the growth rate
have departed from the norm. Growth increased in the ﬁrst year of the recent
episode, and the real effective exchange rate rose as would be expected, but
growth collapsed in 2001 and 2002, and the real exchange rate fell. Since then
there has been a recovery in output and a small rise in the real exchange rate.
If history is a reliable guide, reserve accumulation in this episode will
moderate relative to the current account surplus but will continue until there
is a signiﬁcant decline in the surplus. Meanwhile the real exchange rate
will continue to rise, but at a moderate rate, and output growth will 
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Figure 6. Japan: Current Account Balance, Net Ofﬁcial Assets, Exchange Rates, and
GDP Growth in Three Episodescontinue to improve slowly. When the current account deteriorates,
reserve accumulation will end and the real value of the yen will fall.
China has the longest continuing sequence of net reserve accumulation
in our sample. From 1990 to 2001 small current account surpluses were
roughly matched by reserve accumulation, with little participation by the
domestic private sector in international ﬁnancial markets (ﬁgure 7). Since
then the current account surplus has grown rapidly, and reserve accumu-
lation has consistently been about double the surplus, as large net inﬂows
of direct investment have been matched by reserve accumulation. Clearly,
the reserve buildup since 2002 is unusual by historical measures. We have
not seen a sequence of private capital inﬂows ﬁnancing reserve accumula-
tion on anything like this scale before.
Nor, as the right-hand panel shows, have we yet seen any of the predicted
precursors of a successful speculative attack. The real exchange rate fell
until 1999, when the nominal rate was ﬁxed. Since then the rate has moved
with the dollar, falling by about 4 percent from 1999 through 2003. Recall
that this is a real effective rate, so that the standard model would predict a
gradual erosion of the authorities’ ability to control inﬂation. We have seen
no evidence of this to date.
Finally, high growth rates during the sequence of current account sur-
pluses are clearly a feature of this history. As in the case of Japan, our
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; International Institute of Finance; World Bank, World 
Development Indicators; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
a. See footnote a of figure 5 for the definition of an episode.
Figure 7. China: Current Account Balance, Net Ofﬁcial Assets, Exchange Rates, and
GDP Growth in One Episodereading of history is that the reserve accumulation will continue until the
current account surplus turns around for other reasons. In China’s case an
interruption of direct investment inﬂows or liberalization of capital outﬂows
might generate a real depreciation and an end to the sequence of reserve
accumulations.
Korea experienced one sequence of net reserve accumulations that meets
our criteria from 1986 to 1989, and a second episode started in 1998 and
continues today (ﬁgure 8). During the earlier episode, reserve accumulations
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; International Institute of Finance; World Bank, World 
Development Indicators; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
a. Year in bold refers to the first year after the end of an episode.  See footnote a of figure 5 for the definition of an episode.
Figure 8. Korea: Current Account Balance, Net Ofﬁcial Assets, Exchange Rates, and
GDP Growth in Two Episodesroughly matched an increasing current account surplus and came to an end
when the surplus declined. The real exchange rate rose in the ﬁnal two
years of the episode and declined the year following and for the next two
years. In the familiar pattern, growth slowed in the ﬁnal year of accumu-
lation but then rebounded for the next two years.
The episode that started in 1998 is not unusual. Reserve accumulation
has approximately matched a U-shaped sequence of current account sur-
pluses, and the real exchange rate has risen.
Summary of Findings
To conclude, we have looked at a large body of data to evaluate the rel-
evance of the standard model for understanding developments in emerg-
ing economies with chronic current account surpluses since 1970. We ﬁnd
almost no support for the standard model, which predicts an eventual spec-
ulative attack on a strong currency. Episodes of net reserve accumulation
coincide with growing current account surpluses. Reserve accumulations
end when the current account surplus declines or (as often happens) swings
all the way into deﬁcit. Most important, the real exchange rate weakens at
the end of accumulation episodes, and there is generally a small downturn
in economic activity. Such a sequence is consistent with a variety of real
and ﬁnancial shocks to the surplus economy. But a real depreciation fol-
lowing the authorities’ decision to stop accumulating reserves is not con-
sistent with a speculative capital inﬂow or a successful speculative attack.
Recall that, in the standard model, the regime ends with a burst of inﬂation
or a forced nominal appreciation of the currency, either of which would be
associated with a real appreciation. We do observe “sudden starts” of private
capital inﬂows to ﬁnance a current account deﬁcit, but these are associated
with a falling real value for the currency, presumably to generate increases
in expected yields that draw private capital into the economy.
Let us reemphasize what we did not ﬁnd in the data. We did not ﬁnd
sequences of reserve accumulation followed by revaluations that generated
capital losses for the government.
15 We did not ﬁnd sequences of reserve
accumulation followed by recessions generated by a real appreciation of
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15. Calculations of such book losses have become a central arithmetical exercise
among those issuing dire warnings and calling for an end to the system. See, for example,
Roubini and Setser (2004) and Eichengreen (forthcoming).the currency. This history suggests to us that the contemporary pattern of
current account surpluses can continue in these economies until there is a
major negative shock to demand for their exports. A cyclical downturn in
the United States might be a likely candidate.
Nothing Lasts Forever
The historical record we have presented suggests that most current
account surplus regimes have not been terminated by speculative attacks.
If this interpretation is correct, there is no obvious constraint on the abil-
ity of existing surplus regimes to continue to ﬁnance a current account
deﬁcit in the center country. A common theme in international ﬁnance is
that repressed systems do not last forever. We agree they last for no more
than twenty years and probably less, but the important point is that they
are effective for substantial periods.
Of course, what countries can do tells us nothing about what they will
want to accomplish. They could listen to the eminent advice and join the
Washington consensus and the international ﬁnance textbooks by importing
capital and developing internally. Our Revived Bretton Woods argument
suggests that they will want to do just the opposite. That is, the governments
of trade account countries will want to lend to the rest of the world and,
in particular, to the center country. And they will counter efforts by the
domestic private sector to export capital, through controls and sterilized inter-
vention. An important part of our story is that the real exchange rate distor-
tion will decline over time and vanish at the end of the adjustment period.
So the big speculative incentive is front-loaded, and the beginning of a
reserve accumulation episode is precisely the time in an emerging econ-
omy’s history when ﬁnancial repression is most likely to be effective. An
important constraint on capital inﬂows into China is the underdeveloped
and bankrupt domestic ﬁnancial market. As the industrial sector grows and
that sector lobbies for a better domestic ﬁnancial system, the whole fabric
of ﬁnancial repression will unravel. But this takes time.
In our framework the Chinese government is not accumulating reserves
because of a mindless infatuation with a ﬁxed nominal exchange rate. It is
instead using a real undervaluation of its currency to limit urban migration
and to subsidize rapid industrialization and absorption of unemployed
labor. So, at the end of the process, the government anticipates holding a
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if, as is typical, the renminbi depreciates in real terms, there is no capital
loss in the endgame. In any case the government anticipates having by
that time a physical capital stock that is larger and more productive than
today’s and a labor force that is employed and paying taxes. The one is the
prerequisite for the other. The government’s portfolio of interests includes
the domestic capital stock as well as foreign exchange reserves; the value
of that portfolio should not be maximized locally over its individual sub-
components.
That Old-Time Religion, It’s Good Enough for Me: It Is 1958
The ﬁnancial press and several widely quoted experts have argued that
our comparison of the current international monetary system to the Bretton
Woods system is problematic. In particular, they point out that the United
States did not ﬁnance a large and persistent current account deﬁcit under
Bretton Woods, and indeed the mere forecast of such a deﬁcit in the late
1960s was enough to bring the system to a painful end. In addition, unlike
in the original Bretton Woods system, there is now a viable alternative
reserve currency, the euro, and there are no formal arrangements to pre-
vent reserve diversiﬁcation. We argue below that this is a misreading of
the nature of the system then and now and of the forces that brought the
Bretton Woods system to an end.
The Old-Time Religion: Balance of Payments Deﬁcits Are Not
Current Account Deﬁcits
During the Bretton Woods years, the United States did not run large
current account deﬁcits, the measure of external imbalance that most draws
our attention today. But, in the reckoning of the day, it did run large and
persistent balance of payments deﬁcits. The deﬁnition of an external deﬁcit
that was natural to economists and policymakers at the time seems today
to have been forgotten or to be treated as a curious and outmoded accounting
convention. Almost all the old-timers focused on a liquidity deﬁnition of
the balance of payments, which Ragnar Nurkse explained as follows:
A country with a deﬁcit in its balance of payments can cover the deﬁcit either
by an outﬂow of gold or an inﬂow of foreign short-term funds. . . . These funds
are equivalent to a loan by foreigners and should be regarded as a draft on the
172 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005recipient countries stock of international reserves. . . . The foreign short term
funds are a liability, can be withdrawn at any moment, and must be treated as a
negative gold reserve.16
Notice that this deﬁnition implicitly adds elements of the capital account,
namely, the balance of trade in longer-term assets, to the current account
in order to deﬁne a payments imbalance. It emphasizes strictly net ﬂows
of gold and short-term claims, that is, liquidity, in deﬁning the balance of
payments. Two generations of students of international economics have
been kept in the dark about this concept or, at most, trained to think of it as
an odd creation of the old-timers, mentally straitjacketed by the completely
controlled economies of their day. Yet there it is in the literature: they
harped continually about the growing U.S. balance of payments deﬁcits.
For instance, in his valedictory on the old international monetary system,
French president Charles de Gaulle said
....  But in addition, the fact that a large number of countries accept, out of
principle, dollars in the same way as gold to compensate, when appropriate, any
deﬁcits that arise to their advantage from the American balance of payments,
leads the United States to become voluntarily indebted to foreign countries. . . .
instead of paying them totally in gold, the value of which is real, that you can
only possess if you have earned it and that you cannot transfer to others without
risk and without sacriﬁce....
The United States, for want of having necessarily to pay in gold, at least
totally, for their negative balances of payment in accordance with the old rules,
that required countries to take the required steps, sometimes rigorously, to rem-
edy their imbalance, is suffering year after year from a deﬁcit balance. No less
because the total of their commercial exchanges is to their disadvantage. Quite
the opposite! Their material exports always exceed their imports. But that is
also the case for dollars, exports of which are always in excess of imports. In
other words, capital sums are being built up in America, by means of what
should really be called inﬂation, which, in the form of dollar loans granted to
countries or to private individuals, are being exported. As, in the United States
itself, the increase in currency circulation that results from this makes invest-
ments within the country less remunerative, there is an increasing trend there to
invest abroad. This leads, for certain countries, to a sort of expropriation of
some of their companies. . . .
But circumstances are such today that we can even wonder how far the problem
would go if the countries that hold dollars wanted, sooner or later, to change
them into gold? Although such a general movement would never take place, it
is still the fact that there is an imbalance that is, to a certain extent, fundamental.17
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16. Nurkse (1945, p. 3).
17. Press conference at the Palais de l’Elysée, February 4, 1965.The old fundamentalists said there was a balance of payments problem.
The modern secularists say there was not, because the current account was
in surplus. So what brought about this change? A change in deﬁnition.
The Modern Secular View: Yes, They Are
The intertemporal maximization model of the international monetary
system found in most modern textbooks assumes that the system is based
entirely on trust and freely ﬂowing capital. Private international capital
transactions dominate and therefore undo ofﬁcial interference. Such trans-
actions are based on the assumption that debtors willingly repay creditors,
and those who suffer capital losses willingly repay those who enjoy capital
gains without the imposition of infrastructure to secure this result. Observed
net and gross capital transfers are interpreted as private intertemporal trade
in goods and services. Boiled down to this dimension, goods and services
should ﬂow, on net, from high-income, slow-growing economies to low-
income, fast-growing economies so that consumption can be smoothed over
time. This ﬂow imbalance can be sustained for a long time and reach high
levels because it can be repaid later with surpluses that come from rapid
growth. Trust is all that is needed.
That this theory generates more puzzles than insights is problematic but
has not hindered its dominance. For example, an inconvenient parallel lit-
erature on sovereign debt has difﬁculty concluding that anyone should
repay international debt, yet we somehow reconcile ourselves to this con-
tradiction in two basic traditions in international ﬁnance.
Which Is More Realistic, Collateral or Trust?
A unifying conceptual basis for both the original and our Revived Bretton
Woods system is the idea that the international monetary system was and is
based on collateral, not on trust. Nurkse and his contemporaries believed the
international monetary system depended on countries’ willingness and abil-
ity to deliver gold on demand. A country’s ability to deliver gold could be
instantly reduced by calling its short-term credits. It follows that the liquid-
ity balance was the natural measure of the change in the position of gov-
ernments, including the government of the center country.
It is our contention that the current system also runs on collateral, not on
trust. International net saving transfers are too small (except to the United
States) because no one trusts a net debtor (the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle).
174 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005Gross two-way trade in assets is too small because no one trusts a poten-
tial loser (the home bias puzzle).
In the original Bretton Woods system, the United States was able to
provide intermediation services to the world because it posted a stock of
collateral in the only form that was acceptable at that time, that is, gold.
18
Nurkse was right that the ability of the United States and other countries
to participate in international markets was limited by the stock and distri-
bution of gold. A similar implication of our view of collateral in the Revived
Bretton Woods system is that a country that wants to participate in private
international intermediation has to post collateral. In 1949 the United States
had, as it were, the only triple-A credit rating in the system, and so it could
hold its own collateral. As de Gaulle pointed out, however, this was no longer
the case in 1965, when liquid claims on its collateral were substantial.
The key idea in our analysis of the current system is that “earned” U.S.
dollar reserve assets have replaced gold as the ultimate reserve asset. The
only collateral “asset” that everyone trusts are goods already delivered to
the United States by other countries. These goods come to the United
States via U.S. current account deﬁcits. Everyone trusts the United States
to keep these goods or, what is the same thing, to “default” on U.S. ofﬁcial
liabilities to selected foreign governments if those governments steal the
private assets of U.S. residents or others, especially in the context of a
geopolitical bump.
In this sort of default, the Treasury does not cease paying on its own
obligations owned by the problematic foreign government. In practice, it
has in the past frozen assets, converting them from liquid to completely
illiquid claims, placed service payments into blocked accounts, forced long-
term rollovers at Treasury bill rates, and redeﬁned the ultimate claimants
and recipients of these payments in legal cases, which may emanate from
ex post legislation.
Moreover, as in Nurkse’s explanation above, a country cannot usefully
borrow reserves. It would then have nothing to lose, since it could simply
default on its liability.
19 In our view reserves and other ofﬁcial or even pri-
vate foreign-held assets are collateral only if they have been earned by net
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18. The United States did sit on its own gold reserve, and so there was some trust even
in this arrangement. It also sat on a large chunk of everyone else’s gold.
19. That is why Argentina’s reserves are not collateral, but rather loans from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. To seize them would be to seize the IMF’s capital.exports of goods and services. If they are not so earned, they are by deﬁn-
ition borrowed. If borrowed, there are no already-delivered goods for the
United States to keep, and there is hence no collateral.
Critics of the collateral approach argue that the U.S. Treasury would
never damage its reputation by defaulting on an ofﬁcial reserve liability.
We have two reactions. First, the Treasury has frequently done so in the
past. Several such actions are described below, along with a more detailed
history of a recent case. Second, we argue that transferring collateral to
the rightful owner in circumstances envisioned in the collateral relation-
ship preserves the reputation of the U.S. government both as a debtor and
as an impartial and reliable enforcer of collateral arrangements. In deliv-
ering its liability to the injured party, the United States is not defaulting on
its obligations. It is honoring both its promise to pay and its promise to pay
the rightful owner of its obligation. The identity of the rightful owner is
conditioned by the terms of the collateral arrangement. Both reputations
contribute to the demand for U.S. international reserves. But an important
implication of our approach is that the second of the dual roles, that of
enforcer of collateral arrangements, is the only unique function of an inter-
national reserve currency.
In a private collateral arrangement, the rights and obligations of the
participants are clear and explicit. The rights and obligations of govern-
ments in the collateral arrangement we have described are implicit and
necessarily less clear. For example, the event that would trigger transfer
of ownership of U.S. ofﬁcial liabilities is not deﬁned, as it would be in a
private collateral arrangement. But historical precedents exist. The United
States has transferred ownership following major geopolitical incidents such
as wars, invasions, revolutions, hostage takings, and nationalizations of
foreign investment. That there is uncertainty about what set of events would
trigger transfer of collateral does not mean that there are no such events or
that private investors do not value the protection offered by collateral in
those circumstances.
There is also uncertainty concerning what set of creditors to a country
would actually beneﬁt from collateral arrangements. But even a random
distribution among creditors would be a signiﬁcant disincentive for a sov-
ereign on the international periphery considering whether to seize assets,
provided it had enough collateral at risk. Uncertainty about what events
will trigger transfer of collateral and uncertainty about the distribution of
176 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005the transfer make governments’ collateral less powerful than private col-
lateral. Our conclusion is that more of it is needed to support a given scale
of ﬁnancial intermediation.
Ricardo Caballero and A. Krishnamurthy have similarly argued that
international collateral is necessary to support private ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation within advanced and emerging economies.
20 They also emphasize
that an important market failure in emerging economies is the inability to
produce assets that can be used as collateral, making it necessary to import
such assets. Caballero elsewhere relates this to the private ﬁnancing of the
U.S. current account deﬁcit as follows: “There is an enormous demand for
saving instruments in the world, and the US is the most efﬁcient producer
of such instruments. No other place combines the volume from new oppor-
tunities and ability to generate trustworthy saving instruments from each
unit of physical investment put on the ground.”
21 An important aspect of
their analysis is that ﬁnancial crises can reduce the supply of collateral
assets in emerging economies, and that this might constitute the real costs
of such crises. Moreover, even developed ﬁnancial markets can lose their
ability to produce safe assets following a severe ﬁnancial crisis like that
which has plagued Japan in recent years.
We are just beginning to explore the economic signiﬁcance of private and
ofﬁcial holdings of international collateral and how the two might interact. Is
private collateral a substitute for ofﬁcial holdings of safe assets? Is ofﬁcial
collateral necessary for the credibility of cross-border private collateral
arrangements? Our framework is based on the idea that ofﬁcial collateral is
required because, when trouble comes, private international credit arrange-
ments are enforced, if at all, by governments. There is, of course, ample
room for clariﬁcation and improvement of our understanding of these mech-
anisms. But two things seem to us clear. The United States is a source of safe
assets that cannot be produced locally in most of the rest of the world. And,
since borrowed collateral is an oxymoron, most of the rest of the world has
to earn these assets by delivering goods to the United States.
Could Europe, offering the euro as an alternative reserve currency, re-
place the United States as the preferred custodian of collateral? Clearly this
is possible. As many observers have recently pointed out, the European
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21. Caballero (2004).Union already provides euro-denominated government debt that is a credi-
ble promise to pay. Moreover, some diversiﬁcation from dollars to euros
might make sense in terms of a narrow risk-return calculus. But our con-
jecture is that the dollar will remain the dominant reserve currency as long
as the European Union is less willing or less able than the United States to
enforce collateral arrangements. Since the European Union has no track
record in this regard, it seems unlikely that the euro will soon challenge the
position of the dollar in the international monetary system. For this to change
would require markets to come to expect that some European governments
would be willing to accept large current account deﬁcits and to block the
movement of euro reserves as a way of punishing a country (possibly an
aggressive one) that expropriates foreign assets. In our view both expecta-
tions are unlikely. At this point in history, substituting euros for dollars
places collateral out of the reach of creditors and therefore considerably
reduces its usefulness.
Our approach is based on the view that there is little trust between key
countries in the international monetary system. In such a system, everyone
sees tremendous beneﬁts from international ﬁnancial intermediation, but
no one can afford the risk of letting another country owe them substantial
amounts of goods. The best risk is the central reserve country. Put another
way, without trust, the stock of net ﬁnancial indebtedness must always be
less than the stock of collateral that can be seized. In domestic ﬁnancial
markets the stock of real capital that can be pledged as collateral is large
relative to credit balances. Although collateral is a universal feature of
domestic credit relationships, it is seldom a binding constraint, at least in
the aggregate. In international ﬁnance just the opposite is the case. Huge
stocks of national wealth exist but are useless in creating incentives for
repayment, because mass default is often generated by government via
the domestic legal system.
Some Evidence on the Durability of Reserve Currency Status
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA,
which supplanted the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917) empowers the
president of the United States to freeze foreign-owned assets under U.S.
control. The IEEPA authorizes the use of sanctions when the president
sees an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the “national security, for-
eign policy, or economy” of the United States and declares a national
178 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005emergency.22 The word “emergency” allows the window to be slammed
shut if, for example, a foreign country threatens to launch a ﬁnancial
attack by withdrawing funds or to pull out a substantial amount of funds
out in order to prevent their seizure. As described by the U.S. Information
Agency, a freeze on foreign-owned assets
can be applied selectively to a particular country, or to a group of countries, in
time of war or in response to a national emergency. . . .
The procedure can be used to serve three purposes:
—to deny authorities in blocked countries access to assets that might be used
against the US
—to protect the true owners of the assets from illegal attempts to seize their
property
—to create a pool of assets for possible use in settling US claims against blocked
countries, or for use as a bargaining chip in negotiating an eventual return to
normal relations.23
During World War II, assets owned by Germany, Japan, and Italy were
blocked and eventually used in settling war claims against them. Simi-
larly, assets of Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria,
and Czechoslovakia were blocked after these countries fell under Soviet
domination. Asset blockings were subsequently imposed against North
Korea and China in 1950, Cuba in 1963, North Vietnam in 1964, Rhode-
sia (now Zimbabwe) in 1965, Kampuchea (Cambodia) in 1975, Iran in
1979, Libya in 1986, Panama in 1988, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) in 1992, and Afghanistan in 1999. In 1990 the
United States blocked $30 billion in assets belonging to Iraq and Kuwait.
In 1979 it blocked $12 billion of Iran’s assets, including $5 billion in off-
shore branches of U.S. banks; part of this was used to pay off syndicated
loans by U.S. banks to Iran, and $1.4 billion was sent to the Bank of Eng-
land to cover claims in the United Kingdom. Another $1 billion was held
against awards from the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal.
24
These asset freezes have occurred under a variety of circumstances. Some
of the asset blockings were aimed at adversaries in a declared or undeclared
war (Germany, Japan, Italy, China, North Korea, and Iraq). Some were aimed
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22. See the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), United States Code
(www.treas.gov/ofﬁces/enforcement/ofac/legal/statutes/ieepa.pdf). Assets frozen under the
IEEPA are administered by the Treasury’s Ofﬁce of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC).
23. U.S. Information Agency, “Freeze of Iraq, Kuwait Assets Has Many Precedents,”
August 28, 1990 (www.fas.org/news/iraq/1990/900828-152460.htm).
24. U.S. Information Agency, “Freeze of Iraq, Kuwait Assets Has Many Precedents.”at friendly countries that had been occupied, with the aim of preserving the
assets pending the restoration of a government recognized by the United
States (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Kuwait). Some countries saw their
assets blocked when they opposed the United States geopolitically or be-
came hostile without war breaking out (Cuba, Iran). Some freezes were im-
plemented as part of a global imposition of sanctions (F.R. Yugoslavia,
Rhodesia). The differences in circumstances notwithstanding, this history
shows that the center country can repeatedly “default” on ofﬁcial liabilities
and still remain the only important provider of reserves.
Conclusion
The international monetary system must create collateral in order to
support international capital transactions. In the industrial countries, the
lack of such collateral might account for the relatively small net and gross
capital ﬂows among them. Collateral is expensive, and the beneﬁts of
trade in ﬁnancial assets among similar countries are probably not great,
even though the legal and expropriation risks are relatively small. For
emerging economies, in contrast, the beneﬁts of trade in ﬁnancial assets
are very large. The irony here is that, to accumulate collateral (or “net
reserves” to the more traditional among our readers), the emerging econ-
omy must export national saving. This is bad from the modern secularist
perspective, but it is orthodoxy in the old-time religion. The beneﬁts of
two-way trade in ﬁnancial assets are potentially enormous for countries that
have high saving rates but waste the resources thus generated when they
are channeled through inept domestic ﬁnancial systems. These countries
need to run the modern version of a liquidity surplus.
Some observers have taken a too-legalistic interpretation of our deﬁni-
tion of international collateral. We do not argue that any set of private
investors in an emerging economy would beneﬁt or would expect to ben-
eﬁt from the collection of collateral by the United States, and in the case
of China we have in mind much more the sort of expropriation that might
result from a geopolitical clash. Nevertheless, both U.S. and non-U.S. pri-
vate (portfolio and direct) investors know that an emerging economy that
is an international creditor has something to lose from conﬁscation of its
investments abroad. It seems clear to us that European direct investors in
Argentina, for example, would have fared much better in recent years if
180 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005the government of Argentina had owned net assets in the United States. In a
general sense our argument is that the government of an emerging economy
needs a strong incentive to stay out of the way of private international ﬁnan-
cial intermediation. Building a positive net international asset position seems
to us the obvious way for it to create that incentive. The real potential
for globalization of international ﬁnance lies in governments of emerging
economies posting collateral in the United States to support private two-way
trade in ﬁnancial assets. The current general move in emerging economies,
in both Asia and Latin America, toward reducing sovereign debt and build-
ing international reserves may be based on an implicit understanding of
how the system really works.
APPENDIX A
Data Sources and Methodological Notes
Episodes of Ofﬁcial Asset Accumulation
We deﬁne an episode as a period of three or more years where
—the ofﬁcial sector increases its stock of international assets
—on average the ofﬁcial sector entirely or partly ﬁnances the current
account, and
—the ofﬁcial sector generates more than 25 percent of the change in
national net foreign assets.
The second part of the deﬁnition is equivalent to the country running
current account surpluses during the episode. As described above, the sec-
ond requirement binds only on average; it is possible to ﬁnd one or more
observations where the country runs current account deﬁcits, although in
the data this appears very rarely.
Net Ofﬁcial Assets
Net ofﬁcial assets are deﬁned as the sum of the following items in the
“general government” and “monetary authority” accounts in the balance of
payments (all on a net basis): capital transfers, portfolio investment assets
(equity and debt, the latter including bonds, notes, and money market
Michael Dooley and Peter Garber 181instruments), ﬁnancial derivatives, other investment (trade credits, loans,
currency and deposits), and reserve assets.
For the following countries, partial quarterly estimations have been
calculated for 2004: Japan, Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine (two-quarter
estimations); Denmark, Indonesia, and Korea (three-quarter estimations).
Current Account
Current account data were obtained from the International Financial
Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund and from the Interna-
tional Institute of Finance (IIF) dataset. All forecasts for 2005 and 2006
come from the IIF dataset. The current account data are expressed as a
ﬂow variable in millions of dollars from the end of one ﬁscal period to the
beginning of the next.
GDP Growth
GDP growth data were obtained from the World Bank’s World Devel-
opment Indicators and the IIF dataset. All forecasts for 2005 and 2006 come
from the IIF dataset.
Real Effective Exchange Rates
The commonly used deﬁnition of the real effective exchange rate is
where e is the exchange rate of the subject currency against the dollar (in
dollars per subject currency unit), in index form; ei is the exchange rate of
currency i against the dollar (in dollars per currency unit), in index form;
wi is the weight attached to currency i; P is the consumer price index (CPI)
of the subject country; and Pi is the consumer price index of country i.
REER data were retrieved from the IFS, IIF, and Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development datasets. Data are reported as index values,
where an increase indicates an appreciation of the local currency.
Coverage
The list of countries in the sample is available from the authors. The initial
sample of 164 countries was reduced to 115 because of unavailability of data.




















































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; International Institute of Finance; World Bank, World 
Development Indicators; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
a. Year in bold refers to the first year after the end of an episode.  See footnote a of figure 5 for the definition of an episode.
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APPENDIX C
Real Exchange Rate Changes, Reserves, Current 
Account Balances, and GDP Growth in Reserve
Accumulation Episodes
Average real  Cumulative change 
depreciation in  reserves 
(percent a year) (millions of dollars)
First year First year
Duration During after During after 
Episode (years) episode episode episode episode
Argentina, 1976–79 4 6.7 −23.9 8,810 −2,598
Bulgaria, 1982–85 4 2 −26.9 1,053 −885
Canada, 1996–2001 6 −0.2 3.7 19,926 −185
China, 1990–present 15+− 4.5 ... 410,674 . . .
Colombia, 1976–80 5 n.a. 4.6 4,287 −21
Colombia, 1989–94 6 2 6.3 4,728 −4
Croatia, 1993–95 3 14.3 0.3 1,652 533
Denmark, 2001–present 4+ 3.3 . . . 13,537 . . .
Egypt, 1990–94 5 −2.9 4 15,615 409
Finland, 1997–2002 6 −1.2 4.2 3,261 −508
France, 1977–80 4 2.3 −3.7 11,796 −3,588
France, 1983–86 4 1.4 −1.1 10,417 −2,602
Germany, 1971–73 3 4.2 −1.7 18,312 −523
Germany, 1976–78 3 1.2 −4.3 21,011 −3,590
Hong Kong, 1999–2001 3 n.a. −4.4 24,755 −2,377
Hungary, 1990–92 3 7.9 1.1 2,905 2,575
Hungary, 1995–97 3 1.2 0.5 2,983 791
India, 1976–79 4 n.a. n.a. 6,578 −624
Indonesia, 2002–present 3+ 6.4 . . . 8,245 . . .
Ireland, 1993–95 3 −2.2 −1 4,823 −52
Italy, 1987–89 3 1.4 1.3 25,245 11,623
Japan, 1986–88 3 12.1 −4.4 70,747 −13,058
Japan, 1992–96 5 1.8 1.6 147,110 6,567
Japan, 1999–2004 6+ 0.4 ... 398,985 . . .
Jordan, 1999–2003 5 −0.3 −0.2 3,411 n.a.
Korea, 1976–78 3 −13.5 −16.9 3,385 749
Korea, 1986–89 4 2.9 −3 13,036 −1,208
Korea, 1998–present 7+− 0.6 ... 122,894 . . .
Malaysia, 1976–80 5 −3 3.7 2,652 −235
Malaysia, 1985–93 9 −2.2 0.4 25,398 −3,160
Malaysia, 2001–03 3 −3 −3 14,838 n.a.
Morocco, 1996–2002 7 0.3 0.3 6,782 1,649Michael Dooley and Peter Garber 185




Real GDP growth (percent a year)
First year 
During after  Years of deficit During  Average for three years
episode episode after episode episode after episode
3,120 −4,774 3+ 10 −1.5
612 −951 2 3 5.1
24,902 14,447 0 4.2 2.6
315,476 . . . 0 9.3 . . .
1,029 −1,961 3+ 5.4 6
−2,185 −4,527 3+ 3.8 4.4
−413 −1,049 3+ 1.6 5.1
22,033 . . . 0 1 . . .
−2,937 −1,000 3+ 3.6 5.1
49,845 9,295 0 3.4 1.9
7,592 −4,811 3+ 2.9 1.8
−3,646 −4,446 3+ 1.7 3.8
4,627 9,085 0 3 2.3
16,929 −5,387 3+ 3.7 1.8
27,309 12,596 0 4.7 2.6
1,134 −4,262 3+− 6.2 1.3
−3,451 −2,228 3+ 2.5 4.7
4,441 −1,785 3+ 2.4 5.6
18,676 . . . 0 4.1 . . .
5,063 2,049 0 6.1 9.3
−22,628 −16,479 3+ 3.3 1.4
249,000 63,000 0 4.5 4.6
551,000 97,000 0 1.5 0.3
743,000 . . . 0 1.4 . . .
1984 208 0 3.9 5.2
−1383 −4,151 3+ 10 3.8
34,634 −2,003 3+ 9.8 8.1
130,483 . . . 0 4.2 . . .
130 941 0 8.6 6.4
−6,326 −4,521 3+ 8.1 9.7
27,885 14,400 0 3.3 5.8
2,253 1,593 0 4 3.7 (continued)186 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
Average real  Cumulative change 
depreciation in  reserves 
(percent a year) (millions of dollars)
First year First year
Duration During after During after 
Episode (years) episode episode episode episode
Netherlands, 1970–77 8 1.5 −1.3 3,902 −770
Netherlands, 1992–95 4 2.2 −1.8 11,349 −5,695
Norway, 1980–85 6 1 1 9,442 −3,211
Norway, 1993–97 5 −0.5 −1.7 14,353 −6,384
Norway, 1999–2003 5 1.7 −4.8 13,393 n.a.
Oman, 1989–92 4 −1.4 −6.6 1,302 −1,058
Oman, 1999–2001 3 −1.7 −4.9 3,483 309
Pakistan, 2001–present 4+− 0.3 . . . 10,244 . . .
Portugal, 1985–92 8 2.2 −0.4 16,235 −2,848
Romania, 1986–89 4 −2.7 −31.1 1,614 −1,494
Russia, 1999–2004 6 −0.1 7.2 63,731 n.a.
Saudi Arabia, 1979–82 4 1.6 −3.3 11,432 −1,509
Singapore, 1974–2000 27 −0.3 −2.1 81,135 −861
South Africa, 1989–91 3 2.9 −1 2,030 503
Sweden, 1970–73 4 −0.4 0.2 1,499 −753
Sweden, 1998–2000 3 −2.7 −0.1 5,306 −1,048
Switzerland, 1982–87 6 2.1 −0.3 10,189 −2,382
Ukraine, 1999–present 6+− 4.7 . . . 5,383 3,092
Venezuela, 1979–81 3 11.3 −5.9 7,839 −8,160
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; International Institute of Finance; World Bank, 
World Development Indicators; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
a. A positive number indicates a change in the direction of surplus.
n.a., data not available; . . . , not applicable.Michael Dooley and Peter Garber 187




Real GDP growth (percent a year)
First year 
During after  Years of deficit During  Average for three years
episode episode after episode episode after episode
16,476 −904 1 3.6 2
63,117 21,502 0 2 3.7
11,736 −4,551 3+ 3.4 1.9
33,520 6 0 4.6 2.5
113,812 n.a. 0 1.9 n.a.
563 −1,190 3+ 6.7 4.6
52 0 4.3 3.2
9,277 . . . 0 5.3 . . .
−14 233 0 4.6 1.1
9,874 −3,254 3+− 0.8 −9.1
199,007 40,800 0 6.8 5.2
98,912 −16,852 3+ 2.5 −5.2
116,349 16,137 0 7.5 0.7
5,734 1,967 0 0.4 0.8
2,149 −529 3+ 3.4 2.3
29,648 8,531 0 4.2 1.5
26,869 8,846 0 1.9 3.7
10,606 . . . 0 8.3 . . .
9,078 −4,246 1 −1.3 −1.5188
Comments and 
Discussion
Barry Eichengreen: The ﬁrst rule of forecasting is, “Give them a fore-
cast or give them a date, but never give them both.”
1 Michael Dooley and
Peter Garber have given us a forecast, namely, that the dollar will fall
and U.S. Treasury yields will rise. Bravely, they have also given us a date.
Unfortunately for those of us interested in the future, that date is 1971.
Like Dooley and Garber, I agree that what cannot go on forever gener-
ally will not. But unlike them I do not believe that recent events in finan-
cial markets can help us pin down the timing. The middle of March, just
before the Brookings Panel meeting, saw an increase in noise about the pos-
sibility that foreign central banks might diversify out of dollars. The gov-
ernor of the Bank of Korea made some widely reported comments about
the need for more-active reserve management. Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi of Japan told a parliamentary committee that reserve diversifi-
cation was “necessary.”
2 Y. V. Reddy, governor of the Reserve Bank of
India, said that the diversiﬁcation of reserves was under active discussion.
3
Ukrainian economy minister Sergiy Teriokhin argued publicly that the
country should diversify its reserves out of dollars and into euros.
4 This
upsurge in noise was associated with an eight-month high in Treasury yields,
reinforcing the belief that reserve diversification could eventually force
the dollar down and Treasury yields up.
At the same time, that eight-month high in Treasury yields was not all that
high. I would acknowledge that this is a troubling point. I am not alone, of
1. Attributed to Edgar R. Fiedler by Dickson (1978).
2. Steve Johnson, “Dollar Wobbles on Japan Diversiﬁcation Talk,” Financial Times,
March 10, 2005.
3. Reuters, “Asian Foreign Exchange Reserves: A $2.46 Trillion Question,” March 11,
2005, 11:36 AM.
4. Reuters, March 16, 2005, 12:50PM.Michael Dooley and Peter Garber 189
course: Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has commented on this
issue extensively, to the point where it is now known as the Greenspan
conundrum. Factors invoked to help explain it include the relatively short
supply of new long-term Treasury debt coming onto the market as the debt
managers at the U.S. Treasury shorten maturities, and the inelastic demands
of various institutional investors for government securities. In Dooley and
Garber’s view, the proper interpretation is that ﬁnancial market partici-
pants are attaching a positive probability to Asian central banks continuing
to support the dollar by making massive purchases of Treasury bonds. This
is the substance of the ﬁrst of the authors’ three notes.
Who am I to second-guess the markets, much less to second-guess our
esteemed authors? Well, I’m an economic historian who can recall a sub-
stantial number of previous episodes where major imbalances leading to
sharp changes in exchange rates were not obviously factored into ﬁnancial
markets until immediately before the event. For example, the January-
March 1933 run on the dollar, a suggestive precedent, had virtually no dis-
cernible impact on interest rate differentials or forward exchange rates
until almost immediately before it occurred, despite the fact that the possi-
bility had been actively discussed for the better part of a year.
5 The 1992
attacks on the pound sterling, a currency that commentators regularly cited
as ready for a fall, were similarly not preceded by the emergence of notice-
able interest rate differentials or a forward discount in the foreign
exchange market until a couple of weeks before the denouement.
6 Particu-
larly interesting, given the context, is that in 1968–71, in the run-up to the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the forward discount on the dollar
was very modest, as was the interest rate differential between the United
States and Germany.
7 Then, in the summer of 1971, the forward discount
jumped upward. Although one can always ascribe such behavior to the
arrival of new information, it is not as if people failed to see the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system and a substantial devaluation of the dollar com-
ing. To the contrary, there was an immense contemporary literature warn-
5. See Hsieh and Romer (2001).
6. See Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993).
7. See Obstfeld (1993). Imperfect capital mobility complicates the drawing of infer-
ences from these data, although, as Obstfeld notes, capital mobility was rising strongly
toward the end of the Bretton Woods period. Imperfect capital mobility also complicates
drawing inferences from interest rates today, as Dooley and Garber themselves note.190 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
ing that the system would dissolve and that the dollar would have to fall
substantially. Yet there seemed to be a striking reluctance to take a posi-
tion on this basis until one minute before the clock struck midnight. This
behavior may be hard to reconcile with perfect foresight, but, if it exists,
asset prices will not be telling us when it is 11:58.
8
Dooley and Garber’s second note is an analysis of the end of several
episodes of large current account surpluses accompanied by reserve accu-
mulations. The authors’ intriguing ﬁnding is that many such episodes come
to an unhappy end with a sharp real and nominal depreciation, which is
not how most observers of China expect the current situation to play out.
I would simply observe that how ancillary variables like the real exchange
rate will react when China’s accumulation of reserves ends will depend
on why it ends. If it ends because the People’s Bank of China and the gov-
ernment, observing robust economic growth and mounting inﬂationary pres-
sure, choose to tighten monetary policy in order to cool fears of overheating,
the currency will appreciate. But if they wait until domestic ﬁnancial
excesses further infect the banking system, creating a crisis of conﬁdence,
there may instead be a scramble to get out, causing the currency to crash.
The wisdom of moving away from the peg while conﬁdence is strong,
capital is still ﬂowing in, and reserves are still being accumulated is the
central lesson of the literature on exit strategies.
9 It provides the strongest
argument for why China should abandon its peg to the dollar now.
Dooley and Garber’s third note extends an earlier paper of theirs that
characterizes the role of the United States in the current international
system as providing financial intermediation services to the rest of the
world.
10 The United States borrows short, indeed increasingly short given
the shorter and shorter tenor of Treasury debt, and lends long in the form
8. It is worth recalling that, in the original Krugman-Flood-Garber model, interest rates
remain perfectly stable until the moment the exchange rate collapses, despite the fact that
everyone has perfect foresight and can see the end coming. I understand, of course, that the
interest rate in their model is the instantaneous rate, not the long-term rate, and that the result
depends on some restrictive assumptions. But add to this the well-known fact that the mar-
kets appear to attach a heavier weight to short-term rates than the term-structure hypothesis
would lead one to predict, and it is possible to reconcile the conviction that the end is near
with the observed low level of long-term rates.
9. See, for example, Eichengreen and Masson and others (1998) and, for an application
to China, Eichengreen (forthcoming).
10. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004b).Michael Dooley and Peter Garber 191
of foreign direct investment (FDI). It thus provides liquidity transformation
services like those of a bank. It enhances the efﬁciency of resource alloca-
tion, also like a bank. Again, there is a suggestive analogy with the Bretton
Woods system, there having been an argument in that period that the United
States was acting as banker to the world, borrowing short and lending long.
It was similarly argued that the U.S. deﬁcit on liquidity account was not a
problem because foreigners were simply the happy recipients of these
intermediation services.
11
But there is a difference between the Bretton Woods era and today,
namely, that the present situation occurs against the backdrop of large,
ongoing current account deﬁcits for the country that is banker to the world.
In principle, there is no reason why the country with the most efﬁcient ﬁnan-
cial system, which is therefore providing intermediation services to the
rest of the world, cannot run a balanced current account or, for that matter,
a surplus. There is no reason why importing short-term capital and export-
ing long-term capital should also require it to run a current account deﬁcit,
as the United States is doing. The United States ran current account sur-
pluses following World War II, even after contemporary economists stopped
referring to the dollar gap. Britain ran persistent current account surpluses
before World War I, when it was similarly acting as banker to the world.
Being an international ﬁnancial center and providing maturity transfor-
mation services to the rest of the world does not doom a country to current
account deﬁcits.
So China must be buying something else through its bilateral surpluses
and heavy investment in U.S. Treasury bonds. According to Dooley and
Garber, it is buying custodial services. The United States, in their view, is
now custodian to the world (this is not a comment on the postindustrial
economy). In other words, the United States holds the collateral against
which countries like China are able to borrow. China can then attract FDI
from abroad, because if it ever decided to nationalize U.S. or other private
assets, the United States would then default on its ofﬁcial liabilities held
by the Chinese government.
This is a provocative hypothesis whose validity is highly questionable.
For one thing, the story is speciﬁc to China, whereas the accumulation of
11. See Despres, Kindleberger, and Salant (1966). Others objected to this view on the
grounds that the capital inﬂow was really the temporary balancing item that offset a U.S.
current account surplus that was too small to fully ﬁnance U.S. FDI abroad.192 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
reserves and chronic surpluses in trade with the United States is a pan-Asian
phenomenon. No one worries that Japan, Korea, or Taiwan will expropriate
U.S. investments, yet they, too, hold massive claims on the United States.
I am not aware of any U.S. corporate executives pointing to China’s large
dollar reserves as a form of collateral justifying their decision to invest
there. Nor am I aware of statements by Chinese ofﬁcials explaining that
they are accumulating Treasuries as a way of posting collateral for FDI
inﬂows. Dooley and Garber rightly emphasize the importance of looking
at the current international ﬁnancial system through the eyes and statements
of Asian ofﬁcials. Here is an instance where their point works against them.
Moreover, the timing is wrong: U.S. FDI in China began to rise around
1992, yet the massive reserve accumulation started nearly a decade later.
Then there is the fact that the United States accounts for only a small frac-
tion of FDI in China: Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy ﬁnd that it
accounts for less than 10 percent.
12 Thus one must assume that the United
States would be willing to go to bat not just on behalf of U.S. private foreign
investors but also on behalf of investors from other countries. In addition,
the way foreign investments in China have been expropriated historically
is through the surreptitious stripping of assets by Chinese managers and
joint-venture partners. It is hard to imagine that the U.S. government would
risk tarnishing its public credit in response to such behavior. Rather, one
has to assume a major geopolitical blow-up between the United States and
China, a decision by Beijing to freeze all U.S. investments there, and the
U.S. government retaliating by freezing all U.S. Treasury bonds held by
China in custody in the United States. Such events are not beyond the
realm of possibility, but they do not exactly strike me as an obvious way
of explaining the current pattern of global imbalances.
This suggests testing the hypothesis with a systematic analysis of the
impact of inward FDI and property rights protection on the demand for
reserves. Speciﬁcally, I am imagining a regression of the level of reserves
on FDI, where the coefﬁcient on the latter is expected to be larger in
economies where property rights are less secure, the government is com-
munist, and the country is not politically allied with the United States. Of
course, one would have to control for the other standard determinants of
the demand for reserves and correct for the endogeneity of FDI. But this
12. Goldstein and Lardy (2005).Michael Dooley and Peter Garber 193
would be a much more direct way of marshalling evidence for Dooley and
Garber’s hypothesis.
If one accepts that the collateral story is implausible or at best unsubstan-
tiated, how then to explain the Chinese authorities’ insistence on keeping
their currency down against the dollar? We are forced to fall back on the
traditional rationale for export-led growth. The export sector, in this account,
is the locus of knowledge spillovers and productivity growth in a devel-
oping economy. Distortions affecting the economy justify the imposition
of another distortion in the form of an undervalued currency, which pushes
more resources into the export sector than would occur under the unfettered
operation of market forces. The original distortion might be the fact that
the productivity effects associated with producing for export are external
to the ﬁrm, providing an inadequate incentive for private investors to shift
resources into the sector absent other interventions. Or it might be an inef-
ﬁcient ﬁnancial system that prevents saving in the developing economy
from underwriting adequate investment in the export sector. Or it might
be a shortage of organizational knowledge that is strongly complementary
with exports and can only be augmented by export-linked FDI that imports
this organizational knowledge from abroad.
Which of these distortions provides the primary motivation for pursu-
ing the export-led growth strategy matters importantly for how quickly one
should expect the government to move away from current arrangements. I
have the sense that Chinese managers and entrepreneurs are rather quickly
gaining the organizational knowledge necessary to run a modern, export-
oriented manufacturing ﬁrm. I also have the sense that the productivity
effects from learning by exporting are internal as well as external to the
firm, much as they are in other countries. In other words, the time may
not be very long in coming when these justiﬁcations for keeping the exchange
rate artificially low are no stronger in China than in a variety of other
middle-income countries.
The strongest argument in favor of the indeﬁnite maintenance of the
status quo is that the export sector, where productivity is higher than in
the rest of the economy, is being starved of funds by an inefﬁcient Chinese
banking system and that an undervalued renminbi is needed to offset this
distortion, perhaps by artiﬁcially boosting the prices of traded goods rela-
tive to nontraded goods and thus enhancing the proﬁtability of investing
in the traded goods sector. But this would boost the prices of traded goods
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produced by state enterprises or by private ﬁrms. This hardly looks like a
sensible strategy for enhancing efﬁciency.
13 Alternatively, an undervalued
renminbi could lead to China accumulating Treasuries and thus encouraging
efﬁciently allocated FDI in China. This is the reasoning that forces Dooley
and Garber into the logical corner in which they now ﬁnd themselves. It
also brings us back to my earlier objections to the collateral-and-selective-
default story.
If one rejects, as I do, their collateral argument, one must hang one’s
hat on the ﬁrst two distortions: learning spillovers external to the ﬁrm, and
shortages of organizational knowledge. It is then hard to resist the conclu-
sion that these justiﬁcations for an undervalued currency will grow less
compelling rather quickly, for the reasons I have just enumerated. As the
authors point out, capital losses on dollar-denominated reserves should be
counterbalanced against the returns, and these returns are likely to be
strongly declining. In addition, the liability side of the equation should
include also the other costs of undervaluation, such as the limited extent
of monetary control, the incentive under current conditions for large
amounts of credit to ﬂow into the property market (heightening ﬁnancial
fragility), and the additional difﬁculty that this poses for efforts to raise
lending standards and otherwise strengthen the banking system. These
feature not at all in Dooley and Garber’s analysis.
These are all reasons, then, why Asian governments are likely to move
away from the strategy of export-led growth through undervaluation
before long. (But recall the ﬁrst rule of forecasting.) Once countries see
their neighbors doing so, and thereby lending less support to the dollar,
there will be an obvious incentive not to be late in jumping off the band-
wagon.
14 At that point the familiar models of speculative attacks, which
the authors helped to pioneer, will not just be “dancing in our heads.”
13. There is also the question of whether undervaluing relative to the dollar is an appro-
priate strategy for boosting exports in general. The United States takes about a third of
China’s exports (including exports that go via Hong Kong). Even if one aggregates the
other dollar peggers, the share of the “dollar area” is still only 40 percent. Europe mean-
while takes 25 percent of Chinese exports. Over the last ten years the dollar has risen as
well as fallen against the euro. Between 1994 and 2002 it rose very substantially. Was Chi-
nese policymakers’ preference then for increasing overvaluation on an effective basis?
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Jeffrey A. Frankel: In a recent series of papers that have deservedly received
a lot of attention, Michael Dooley and Peter Garber (usually with David
Folkerts-Landau) have put forward the view that the essential elements of
the current international monetary situation bear a strong resemblance to
the old Bretton Woods system, with the Asian central banks today playing
the role of dollar accumulators that Europe played in the 1960s. There is a
lot of insight in their views, which are all the more useful for their uncon-
ventional perspective and language. This is not just another recitation of
familiar positions in a ﬁxed-versus-ﬂoating debate. For example, I think
the authors are right that “The problem for China is to mobilize its existing
enormous domestic saving to create a growing, internationally competi-
tive capital stock that can rapidly employ hundreds of millions of workers
in productive activity. A serious constraint is the lack of a domestic ﬁnan-
cial system capable of channeling this saving into productive capital, tech-
nology, and management skills.” To link these issues to the U.S. balance of
payments situation was an original, imaginative, and thought-provoking
leap.
It is fair to claim, as the authors do, that much of their analysis has now
been generally accepted. This is not to say that one has to credit them for
the insight that Asian central banks are now financing much of the U.S.
current account deﬁcit; that much is obvious. And, at the other end of the
argument, I think the authors have been forced to clarify that they are not
claiming that the current system can continue indeﬁnitely—that the dollar
will never have to depreciate—which many of us thought we heard them
saying at ﬁrst.
1 But I do credit them with the useful insight that the willing-
ness of Asia, and especially China, to pile up unheard-of quantities of dollars
is not simple myopia or mercantilism, but rather part of a deliberate strategy
of export-led growth, which may not be foolish given the structural limi-
tations of their ﬁnancial and corporate governance systems.
I will begin by restating the authors’ case. It is not always easy to
understand everything they say, perhaps because of the novelty of much of
it. I will try to be helpful in defending them against some of the critiques
that have demanded their response. Indeed, I may carry the parallel with
1. See, for example, Eichengreen (2004). Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003,
abstract) wrote, “there is a line of countries waiting [to follow the development strategy of
keeping their currencies undervalued against the dollar] sufﬁcient to keep the system intact
for the foreseeable future.”the Bretton Woods period further than they themselves intended or would
like. I will then, in some respects, try to suggest some different (and perhaps
less unconventional) language to make what seems to me the same argu-
ment. On the key question posed by the title of their paper, however, which
amounts to asking whether we are at the beginning of the revived Bretton
Woods system or the end, I come down on the latter side, or, more precisely,
that we are closer to the end than to the beginning. One could argue that
we are actually at the end, 1971, since the dollar depreciated substantially
against most major currencies during 2002–04, as so many of us predicted
it would when the United States shifted macroeconomic gears four years
ago. But the system may still have a little ways to go in other respects,
such as the much-anticipated end of the peg of the renminbi to the dollar. I
shall argue that in one respect we may be at 1967.
IS THE BRETTON WOODS ANALOGY APPROPRIATE? The ﬁve features of
the current system that the authors enumerate at the beginning of their paper
in fact bear little resemblance to the Bretton Woods system. Certainly, with
no mention of pegged exchange rates or gold, their list bears little relation
to the system that was agreed upon at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in
1944. But I think readers are meant to take “Bretton Woods” to refer to
the de facto system under which all other currencies were pegged to the
dollar, and all other central banks held dollars as the reserve asset because
the dollar was convertible into gold.
2 Speciﬁcally, the “Bretton Woods”
period in this sense refers to the years from 1958, when the European
countries restored convertibility as envisaged in the International Mone-
tary Fund Articles of Agreement, to 1971, when the dollar was devalued,
or perhaps just to 1968, when the United States ceased to allow foreign
citizens to convert dollars to gold.
The ten to thirteen years that this de facto system lasted is not very long
in the broad scheme of things. One might even question whether it was a
“system,” given that it was already breaking down throughout much of that
period, under strain from the U.S. balance of payments deﬁcit. But almost
everyone has long understood these points. That the dollar is still the main
international reserve currency today, that some Asian central banks see it
in their interest to pile up large quantities of dollars, and that their doing
so ﬁnances a large U.S. balance of payments deﬁcit like those of the
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1960s, together probably sufﬁce to justify the analogy with Bretton Woods.
The picture is indeed that of a “system,” in the sense that it shows how the
two halves, the United States and the periphery, ﬁt together into a whole—
a mode of analysis that has largely died out from international macro-
economics since 1971, as Barry Eichengreen points out in his comment.
True, only China and a couple of other Asian economies (Hong Kong and
Malaysia) have currencies that are ﬁxed to the dollar today, even de facto.
But dollar purchases by foreign central banks, especially in Asia, seek-
ing to prevent their currencies from appreciating against the dollar have
nonetheless been very large recently. They have ﬁnanced an increasing
share of the U.S. current account deﬁcit, which itself has been widening
sharply, over the last four years.
In the third of the three “notes” that constitute the Dooley-Garber paper,
the authors take pains to defend themselves against the criticism that the
Bretton Woods analogy is invalid because the United States was not run-
ning a current account deﬁcit in the 1960s as it is today. I agree with them
on this. In the ﬁrst place, the long-term trend in the U.S. current account
balance during the Bretton Woods period was negative, even if the bal-
ance was usually greater than zero. The United States had run substantial
surpluses in the late 1940s, because it had emerged from World War II
with its productive capacity intact. (This was called the period of “dol-
lar shortage.”) The surpluses diminished in the 1950s. True, they then
recovered a bit, peaking in 1964. But from then on the general trend was
downward until the system fell apart in 1971.
In the second place, more-comprehensive measures of the balance of pay-
ments, starting with the basic balance (which includes foreign direct invest-
ment and other long-term capital ﬂows) and the liquidity balance (which adds
short-term, nonliquid ﬂows and errors and omissions), did turn negative. The
overall U.S. balance of payments went into deﬁcit in 1958, which is presum-
ably why the authors single out that year for their Bretton Woods analogy.
These deﬁcits deﬁned the 1960s as a period of excess supply of dollars.3
Both in Europe in the 1960s and in China today, rising foreign direct
investment (FDI)—bilateral FDI as well as overall outward FDI from the
3. The United States was losing reserves throughout 1958–67, and in large amounts
during 1970–71, which forced the devaluation and the closing of the gold window. Foreign
central banks were also piling up dollars, and in ever-larger magnitudes, through most of
the 1960s, and especially starting in 1970. The trend in 1968–69 was actually in the other
direction, perhaps because the United States had begun to make an effort to tighten ﬁscal
policy with a tax surcharge.United States and overall inward FDI to the partners in question—was an
important part of the story, indeed just as important as the trade balance.
One difference is that in Europe the voices decrying “the American chal-
lenge” were louder than those favoring the entry of foreign multinational
companies as part of an intelligent growth strategy, whereas China seems
more welcoming to FDI. When the French complained about the United
States’ “exorbitant privilege”—the ability to trade pieces of paper for
items of more tangible value—they had in mind Americans acquiring
French factories as much as, or more than, French goods. So I think the
authors are on ﬁrm ground in focusing on a broader measure of the balance
of payments, one that includes direct investment, such as the basic balance or
the liquidity balance.
TERMINOLOGY. It may be worth spending a moment on language choices,
so that we are all sure we are talking about the same things. I have some
translating to propose.
The authors use the phrase “trade account country” to refer to a coun-
try that offsets current account imbalances with large changes in official
reserves. They particularly have in mind China, which has been running
a trade account surplus and offsetting it with increases in reserves. They
use the phrase “capital account country” to refer to one that offsets its
current account deﬁcits with capital inﬂows. (Then there is the third set of
countries—Europe and a few others—that are ﬂoaters.) In standard models
the ﬁrst group would be characterized by low capital mobility and a high
propensity for the authorities to intervene in foreign exchange markets to
stabilize the exchange rate, and the second group by high capital mobility
and less of a tendency to intervene. I am afraid that I don’t care for the terms
“trade account country” and “capital account country.” Each time I read
them, I have to stop and remind myself which one is which in the authors’
scheme. I think it would be much more intuitive to call Asia the “exporting
countries” and the United States the “consuming country.” 
AMERICA AS THE WORLD’S BANKER.I   learned from Charles Kindle-
berger thirty years ago that one way to think of the chronic willingness of
other countries to absorb dollars is that the United States acts as the
world’s banker, taking short-term deposits and investing in longer-term,
higher-risk, higher-return assets such as FDI.
4 Thus I accept the idea that
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both parties stand to gain from an exchange of gross capital ﬂows, whereby
U.S. companies undertake direct investment in China and China acquires
dollar bonds. Notwithstanding that U.S. Treasury bills tend to pay a much
lower rate of return on average than the United States earns on its invest-
ments in other countries, I accept the argument that this can be part of a
useful development strategy. (I leave it to others to reconcile this with the
fact that the recent surges of capital into China have been portfolio invest-
ment, not FDI, and that even the FDI has for the most part not come from
the United States.
5) I am still, however, mulling over the notion that FDI is,
as the authors put it, the “lesser credit.” This must mean that the danger of
expropriation by China’s government is greater than the danger that the
United States will depreciate away the value of the bonds, and that there-
fore China has to offer collateral to the United States, not vice versa, and
that supplying exports up front constitutes this collateral. It is an interest-
ing notion.
But while I am thinking about this, I have a question. Where do private
short-term liquid portfolio ﬂows belong in the story? Are we sure it is the
liquidity balance that matters, as the authors say, and not the ofﬁcial settle-
ments balance (or ofﬁcial reserve transactions balance), which is after all
the most comprehensive measure of the balance of payments? Why not
also include short-term portfolio capital ﬂows, even those that are liquid?
In other words, why not draw the line so that all private transactions
appear above the line, and nothing besides ofﬁcial reserve transactions
appears below it? Isn’t the main point that the United States can run
deﬁcits on the overall balance of payments, and that other countries are
forced to run corresponding surpluses in order to earn foreign exchange
reserves? Wasn’t that the point of the two-country version of the monetary
approach to the balance of payments in the 1960s?
6 Don’t the arguments
about how developing countries are forced to post “collateral” against cap-
ital inﬂows apply just as much—actually, more—to their inﬂows of short-
term portfolio capital as to FDI?
If it is just the U.S. monetary authorities who are playing the role of
world banker, the answer is that what matters is the ofﬁcial settlements
balance. If it is the entire U.S. commercial banking sector, what matters is
the liquidity balance. The language of private versus public domination of
5. See, for example, Prasad and Wei (2005).
6. See, for example, Mundell (1971) and Dornbusch (1973).200 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
the capital account makes it sound as if the ofﬁcial settlements balance were
key, that one should draw the line below all private transactions, even liq-
uid short-term banking ﬂows. Consistent with this, the biggest increase in
China’s balance of payments over the last few years has been neither in
the current account nor in FDI, but rather in unmeasured inﬂows that are
generally considered to be speculative and short-term: it is Chinese citi-
zens bringing back onshore liquid investments that they had previously
managed to accumulate offshore. Nor is the circumstance unique to China
of short-term capital ﬂowing from the United States to the emerging mar-
ket, that is, in the same direction as the FDI. This has been a feature of
other emerging markets, both during the most recent boom phase of the
international debt cycle (2002–05) and during the preceding one (1990–96).
Hence all the talk about how capital inﬂows are more likely to lead to
crises if their composition is tilted in the direction of short-term loans,
unless they are fully offset by reserves.
One reason to skip directly to the ofﬁcial settlements balance is that the
liquidity balance and the others are no longer computed. The United States
stopped trying to calculate these statistics long ago, in part because the cap-
ital account statistics are not reliable, in part because it is difﬁcult even in
principle to deﬁne what is a short-term and what is a long-term ﬂow, and
in part because the entire exercise of distinguishing between autonomous
and accommodating transactions became obsolete with the end of the Bretton
Woods system. (The “basic balance,” however, is still reported for some
countries, such as Japan.)
LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES. The authors cite low real interest rates
as evidence that the world is experiencing a glut of saving—that the rela-
tionship is being pushed by the Asian desire to save, rather than pulled by
the U.S. desire to consume. It is true, as they say, that “the fact of unusually
low long-term real interest rates for this stage of the business cycle [is] a
direct challenge to those who . . . claim that the end is near.” My view is
that one of the ways economists can most usefully contribute to real-time
analysis of the economy is by pointing out when some market price seems
to be out of line with historical relationships, the implication being that
it is likely to correct itself within a couple of years. (Examples include
the undervalued U.S. stock market in 1980, the overvalued dollar in 1985,
the overvalued yen in 1995, the overvalued stock market in 2000, and the
undervalued euro in 2002.) Perhaps those observers are right who say that
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deﬁcits shows that there has been a major fundamental shift in the willing-
ness of global investors to hold U.S. debt. But I am willing to bet against
it. Here is one testable disagreement.
My view is that the bond market was buoyed over 2001–04 by three
factors, each of which is already starting to come to an end:
—easy monetary policy in the United States, that is, the purchases of
U.S. Treasury securities by the Federal Reserve (which began to reverse
in the summer of 2004)
—easy monetary policy in Asia, that is, the purchases of U.S. securities
by Asian central banks (who get center stage in the Dooley-Garber story),
and
—the fact that investors appear still to be putting some weight on ofﬁcial
government projections of declining future U.S. budget deﬁcits, despite
all the reasons to disbelieve them.
As these three factors come to an end, nominal long-term interest rates
should rise from their current levels, near 4 percent at the time of this
writing, to above 6 percent. I calculate this as approximately 21⁄2 percent
inﬂation plus 2 percent for a normal real short-term rate plus 1 percent for
a normal term premium plus 1 percent as an extra term premium for an
expected path of a rising debt-GDP ratio. This does not even count the
proposed dumping of huge quantities of new U.S. Treasury bonds on the
market to fund a transition to privatized Social Security accounts. Nor
does it count possible unforeseen factors such as further instability com-
ing from the Middle East or new oil price increases. It seems to me that a
crash is more likely to come in the bond market than anywhere else. But
time will tell.
I would also guess that the dollar will resume its depreciation long before
all unemployed or badly employed labor in China is reallocated to world-
class production (which the authors say will take at least ten years). It is
now in China’s own interest to move away from the peg. It has more
reserves than it can use.
7 But the Chinese authorities do not want to be
pushed into revaluing the renminbi against the dollar.
8 It is safer to bet
7. Frankel (2005b).
8. Li Ruogu, deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China, may have best captured
the Chinese perspective when he said in May 2004, “I think those who call for a ﬁxed
exchange rate are right in the short run. And those who call for a ﬂoating exchange rate are
right in the long run. How long is the short run, you ask? You must understand. China is
8,000 years old. So when I say, short run, it could be 100 years” (author’s paraphrase).202 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
against the U.S. bond market: I think it will probably fall before the dollar
does, or at worst at the same time.
Perhaps my answer to the question of whether it is now 1958 or 1968 is
that it is 1967. In that year the seriousness of the U.S. balance of payments
imbalance had become clear, yet large increases in government spending
were still coming out of Washington—much of that spending, then as now,
on a foreign military adventure—with no evidence of any willingness to
pay for it by raising taxes.
9 Perhaps if it had not been for the Vietnam War
and the Great Society programs—the determination to have both the guns
and the butter—and the associated ﬁscal and monetary proﬂigacy, the
Trifﬁn dilemma would have taken decades to work itself out fully.
10 But
the excessively expansionary U.S. macroeconomic policy accelerated the
process, so that the end came in 1971. To my way of thinking, a funda-
mental systemic structure that produces rising U.S. balance of payments
deﬁcits, combined with excessively expansionary macroeconomic poli-
cies that accelerate the trend, sounds like the situation today. It is in this
respect that I think the current period resembles the 1960s even more, per-
haps, than Dooley and Garber think. But it is also for this reason that I
think the situation is unlikely to be sustainable for ten or twenty years.
Incidentally, easy monetary policy kept real interest rates fairly low in
1967 as well: the federal funds rate was 4.2 percent and the ten-year yield on
government bonds was 5.1 percent, compared with consumer price inﬂa-
tion at 3.0 percent. Thus the Johnson deﬁcits seem to be a better precedent
for the Bush deﬁcits than are the Reagan deﬁcits, which were not initially
accommodated by monetary policy.
THE EURO AS A RIVAL FOR THE DOLLAR.I   both agree and disagree
with the authors’ rejection of recent media reports that central banks are
jumping on a bandwagon of diversiﬁcation of their reserves out of dollars.
Where I agree is that there is an element of hysteria to such reports, which
come in highly predictable waves every time the dollar has been depreci-
ating for a couple of years in a row. The most recent previous cycle occurred
in 1994–95, when articles suggested that the dollar might lose its status as
the unrivaled international reserve currency, that it was in danger of “going
9. See, for example, Solomon (1977, pp. 102–04). In 1968 Congress did pass an income
tax surcharge to help pay for the spending. It was too little, or too late, or both, to head off
rising ﬁscal deﬁcits and inﬂation.
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the way of sterling, the guilder, the ducat and the bezant.”11 The recent cycle
of alarmist articles in the ﬁnancial media was not hard to predict.
The earlier cycle of alarms was wrong. In the ﬁrst place, shares of
reserve holdings in central banks and other measures of international cur-
rency use change only slowly over time. In the second place, these mea-
sures in the 1990s actually showed that the dollar’s share had reversed the
downward trend of the 1970s and 1980s.
12 But this time may be different,
and this is where I am less conﬁdent than the authors. The share of the
dollar in international reserves has again resumed its downward trend.
And there are two or three available explanations. One is that there is now
an obvious rival, the euro, which is more credible as an alternative than
the deutsche mark or the yen ever were. Another is that the United States
now has a net international debt that is large and rapidly rising.
Some argue that, because central banks in Asia hold so many dollars
already, they will be reluctant to diversify into other assets for fear of pre-
cipitating a sharp depreciation of the dollar, in which the value of their
holdings will be the hardest hit. No doubt individual central banks have
this concern. But, as often, I agree with Eichengreen: when each individ-
ual participant decides that it stands to lose more by holding pat than by
joining the run, it will act in its own self-interest.
13 If narrow economic
self-interest is not sufﬁcient to stop the slide, will enlightened geopolitical
calculation do it? In the meantime, the United States has lost popular sym-
pathy and political support in much of the rest of the world. Our past deﬁcits
due to imperial overstretch were manageable when others paid the bills
for our troops overseas: Germany and Japan during the Cold War, Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia in 1991. Now the hegemon has lost its claim to legiti-
macy in the eyes of many. The next time the United States asks other cen-
tral banks to bail out the dollar, will they be as willing to do so as Europe
was in the 1960s, or as Japan was in the late 1980s after the Louvre
Accord? It seems unlikely.
Menzie Chinn and I have documented econometrically some of the com-
monly hypothesized determinants of reserve currency shares: size of the
home economy, rates of return, stability of the currency, historical inertia,
11. Kindleberger (1995, p. 6).
12. Frankel (1995).
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and a tipping phenomenon.14 We have found each of these to be statisti-
cally signiﬁcant during the period 1973–98. We found surprisingly little
support for another hypothesized variable, the net international invest-
ment position of the home country. We use the admittedly brief period of
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 1999–2003, as a crude
test of the out-of-sample performance of the estimated equation. The equa-
tion correctly predicts a small increase in the euro share at the expense of
the dollar during this period. We then use the parameter estimates to pro-
ject into the future. The projections are naturally very sensitive to what one
assumes about the explanatory variables, particularly the size of Euroland.
Our preliminary ﬁnding is that, if some Central and Eastern European
countries join EMU by 2010, and if Sweden, Denmark, and (most impor-
tant) the United Kingdom join by 2015, so that Euroland becomes larger
economically than the United States, the tipping phenomenon could set in
soon thereafter. The euro could deﬁnitively pass the dollar, perhaps in the
subsequent decade. Even if some of the EU countries stay out of Euroland,
as is likely, the tipping could result in response to a future trend deprecia-
tion of the dollar that continues at the same pace as in the past.
It is still true that measures of international currency use such as reserve
shares change slowly. So when one sees newspaper headlines warning of
the euro overtaking the dollar, it is important to realize that this is unlikely
to happen for a long time. But if it does happen, the consequences are
likely to be large. It would mean the end of America’s “exorbitant privi-
lege.” It would be not just a ten-year “system” coming to an end, but the
end of a century of U.S. economic hegemony.
General discussion: Paul Krugman saw the crucial question as not
whether China will stop accumulating foreign exchange reserves, but
whether it will diversify its reserve portfolio, switching to the euro or pos-
sibly the yen. He also noted that loss of reserve currency leadership could
arise not only from diversiﬁcation of existing reserves, but also from diver-
siﬁcation at the margin. He speculated that this would have huge exchange
rate implications. Kenneth Rogoff was skeptical of the authors’ claim that
demand for U.S. assets by Asia’s ofﬁcial sector can explain today’s low
14. See, for example, Bergsten (1975), Dooley, Lizondo, and Mathieson (1989), and
Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000). Chinn and Frankel (2005) provide a comprehensive
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dollar interest rates, and he drew a parallel with recent work by Glenn
Hubbard and Eric Engen, who concluded that the recent huge U.S. budget
deﬁcits do not matter for interest rates. Rogoff also doubted that the huge
pool of surplus Chinese labor entering the global market is driving interest
rates down, noting that standard models would predict the opposite and
that both the capital share of income in the advanced industrial economies
and corporate proﬁts are surging. Michael Dooley replied that the pressure
on interest rates came not directly from labor supply but from China’s very
high saving rate: those savings, effectively, are exported to the rest of the
world.
Rogoff emphasized the role of Japan, whose current account surplus in
recent years is several times China’s and whose reserves are larger. He
noted that arguments based on labor surplus and the collateral hypothesis
do not apply to Japan. He added that other Asian economies also run larger
surpluses than China and together accumulate more reserves than China,
but they are much more open and their capital markets are more integrated
than Europe’s were in the 1960s. Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti was also skep-
tical about the authors’ hypothesis that emerging economies accumulate
U.S. reserves as a form of collateral. He reminded the panel that many of
the countries that have grown rapidly, including Korea, Malaysia, Thailand,
and Indonesia, have typically been borrowers on international markets. The
main exception has been Taiwan, which is a special case for various rea-
sons. Singapore, which is now a large creditor, borrowed heavily in its
early stages of development. Milesi-Ferretti also noted that a country’s
external balance can depend importantly on the terms of trade. Asia’s emerg-
ing economies are mostly commodity importers and are today running large
current account surpluses despite unfavorable terms of trade. If there is a
temporary component in the current high prices of oil and other commodi-
ties that these countries import, the structural surpluses may be even larger
than they appear.
Richard Cooper questioned the presumption of many observers that the
Chinese renminbi is undervalued. He noted that China has substantially effec-
tive controls on resident capital outﬂows, an investment rate of 40 percent
of GDP but an even higher saving rate, and a modest current account sur-
plus relative to the size of the economy. Given these facts and the fact that
exchange rates in the rest of the world are generally ﬂoating, Cooper saw
little evidence that the renminbi is undervalued. Furthermore, he expected
a reform of the Chinese banking system and, eventually, full currency con-206 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
vertibility. In that event the renminbi might well depreciate, because cap-
ital outﬂows would increase as wealthy Chinese households begin to invest
abroad to diversify their portfolios. He added that one already observes
increasingly aggressive foreign direct investment by China, with Chinese
oil ﬁrms just one example.Michael Dooley and Peter Garber 207
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